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Aim and contribution: The current study aimed to explore whether the use of a vection 
based intervention (induced motion) leads to improved memory of threat related material in high-trait 
anxious individuals. Considering evidence showing the importance of context-reinstatement for memory, 
the study’s original contribution to knowledge is that this is the first attempt to examine this in relation to 
threat related material and anxiety.        
 Methods: Ninety students were allocated to three conditions of either watching a video 
depicting a train moving backward, or forward, or no video for the controls. The Spielberger trait-anxiety 
questionnaire (STAI) (Spielberger, 1983) was administrated to measure both state and trait anxiety. 
Following this, participants were required to memorise a list of 20 words, containing 10 threatening and 
10 neutral words (Maddock, Buonocore, Kile, & Garrett, 2003). A distraction of 10 minutes duration was 
used in the form of Sudoku puzzles.        
Results: No significant difference was found between free recall of threat related words or 
neutral words in high-trait anxious versus low anxious individuals, when experiencing vection-based 
intervention compared to controls. Bower’s (1981) theory posits that the current mood of an individual 
affects his or her ability to encode and retrieve information. However, state anxiety did not increase over 
the course of the current experiment, which meant that at retrieval stage participants could not access 
their anxious mood in relation to threat words, which they might have felt at encoding stage. More 
research is needed to understand the relationship between context-reinstatement and memory bias in 
anxiety. Limitations and future directions are explored.       
 Keywords: vection, mental time travel, recall, temporal psychological distance, explicit memory, 
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What motivated this research? 
Grappling with anxiety is perhaps something that we all experience to some extent in our daily 
lives. As a counselling psychologist in training I aspire to contain and alleviate the client’s anxiety as well 
as being in touch with my own process along the way. This has led me to the realisation that anxiety is 
something that I would like to know more about. Discovering that research has established links 
between memory and movement in time and space proved very interesting for me. This is called 
‘temporal Doppler effect’ which refers to the tendency to perceive the future as psychologically closer 
than the past. It has been argued that this tendency is similar to the physical ‘Doppler effect’ in which 
there is a change in the perceived pitch of a sound as the source of that sound approaches the observer 
(Doppler, 1842). Furthermore, it has been shown that participants tend to focus more on the future when 
exposed to a sense of movement forward, and similarly, when presented with a sense of moving 
backward, they tend to focus more on the past compared to controls who were not exposed to any 
movement (Caruso, Boven, Chin, & Ward, 2013). Together with the notion of Doppler effect and its link 
to movement in space, as well as the findings of a recent manuscript in preparation which showed that a 
backward vection (i.e., the process of inducing perception or sensation of movement) enhanced recall of 
neutral words (Aksentijevic, 2017), has led me to the intriguing question of what impact virtual 
movement (i.e., forward or backward) has on free recall of threat related words in high-trait anxious 
individuals given that this will bring them back or forward in time psychologically.  
Why I believe this topic is important?  
This research study offered an opportunity to better understand memory bias in anxiety 
considering that there are no research studies to date that attempted to mentally bring back high-trait 
anxious individuals to the moment of encoding. Therefore, the rationale for the present study is to 
explore the possibility that some of this recall-relevant contextual information could be recaptured by 
psychologically transporting the participant back to the moment when they were first presented with it. 
Since this is a new area of research, its practical implications can not yet be determined. However, 
informed by my clinical practice, I would suggest that future research, which builds on this current study, 
could promote a better understanding of the relationship between memory and mental time travel. 
Specifically, this might help to alleviate anxiety in high-trait anxious individuals by counteracting 
avoidance and thus enabling a more objective processing of threat related stimuli. Furthermore, it may 
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help to improve memory and thus quality of life for patients with Dementia. Finally, it may help patients 
with trauma to re-process their traumatic memory in a more helpful way. Specifically, enabling patients 
with trauma to access the context of the memory might help as it is often the case that they re-
experience intrusive sounds, smells and colours over and above the context in which the trauma took 
place. This happens due to a very active Amygdala (i.e., a part of the brain that is involved with 
experiencing emotions) and inactive Hippocampus (i.e., a part of the brain that is involved with 
processing memory). 
Why is my research important to the field of counselling psychology? 
Counselling psychology and psychotherapy in general can be viewed as being very much 
concerned with the experience of individuals, which is linked dynamically and intimately with memory. A 
better understanding of the relationship between memory and anxiety is vital for counselling psychology 
and psychotherapy in general because memories play a key role in the experience of emotional 
difficulties. The current study serves an important clinical and practical starting point for psychotherapy 
in general and counselling psychology in particular, since it draws new attention to motion manipulation 
on memory for threat related words in anxious individuals. Specifically, it has important implications for 
interventions clinicians make when working with individuals experiencing anxiety. Helping clients think 
about the distance of events in time can have beneficial outcomes. For example, individuals with anxiety 
tend to relate to negative memories, which lead them to anticipate negative future events which they 
perceive as more vivid and very likely to happen (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Therefore, helping anxious 
individuals to understand that negative future events are not as likely to happen as they might imagine, 
can help in the process of working towards more positive achievable goals for their future.  
Why an experiment? 
This study was based on a recent manuscript in preparation which showed that backward 
vection (i.e., the process of inducing perception or sensation of movement) improved recall of neutral 
words (Aksentijevic, 2017). Bearing in mind the critical voice and relational stance that resonates with 
me as part of my training as a counselling psychologist has inevitably led me to question my 
methodology. An experiment is in line with quantitative tradition and perhaps does not go hand by hand 




High-trait anxious individuals demonstrate a variety of information processing biases. They are 
more likely to attend to threat-related compared to neutral stimuli than individuals with low anxiety. In 
regard to this, threat-relevant material refers to stimuli that can elicit anxiety and attract attention to a  
threat before evaluation occurs (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Krsnenburg, & Van-
IJzendoorn, 2007). In such situations, persons are also more likely to interpret ambiguous information 
as threatening and selectively recall threatening stimuli (Mughal, Walsh, & Wilding, 1996; Mitte, 2008). 
This means that anxiety is linked with a variety of cognitive biases influencing attention, interpretation, 
memory and reasoning (Zoe & Field, 2013; Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, & Shafran, 2004). Cognitive 
models of susceptibility to anxiety suggest that these cognitive biases play a part in the aetiology and 
maintenance of anxiety disorders (Beck & Clark, 1997; Eysenck, 1992; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & 
Mathews, 1997). Specifically, it is proposed that unhelpful beliefs, memory bias and distorted perception 
are crucial to the understanding and treatment of anxiety disorders (Beck, 1967; Ellis, 1958).  
 Anxiety refers to feelings of excessive fear, worry and related behavioural disturbances (Norton 
& Sears-Edwards, 2017). Anxiety can be adaptive and helpful but when it is excessive it can lead to 
adverse effects on daily functioning (Strack, Lopes, Esteves, & Fernandez-Berrocal, 2017). Specifically, 
individuals with anxiety disorders report feelings of tension and physical symptoms such as sweating 
and increased heart rate (Schmidt, Norr, Allan, Raines, & Capron, 2017) as well as experiencing 
recurring intrusive worrying thoughts. They may avoid situations because of excessive worry or engage 
in coping behaviours that are counterproductive (Naragon-Gainey, McMahon, & Chacko, 2017). It is 
suggested that avoidance is less adaptive than seeking directly to deal with threat, since avoidance 
involves cognitive distancing and ignoring or minimizing the stressor, thus inhibiting the possibility of 
processing and resolving the stressor (Riley, Wright, Bokszczanin, & Essau, 2017). Theory suggests 
that anxious mood will influence the type of events individuals can access and recall (Bower, 1987). 
 Despite theory proposing that anxious individuals show enhanced memory towards threat-
related material, research findings remain inconsistent (Mitte, 2008). Some studies show higher recall of 
threat-related versus neutral words in high-trait anxious compared to low individuals, while others 
demonstrate lesser recall of threat related words. A review on memory bias in anxiety disorders 
indicates that there is inconsistency in research findings in relation to the role of avoidance in anxiety 
and memory. Furthermore, there is a large amount of experimental psychological research evidence, 
which shows that anxious individuals selectively attend to threat: that is, they show an attentional bias 
 8 
towards threatening material in the environment over neutral material (Coles & Heimberg, 2002; Bar-
Haim et al., 2007). More specifically, attentional bias refers to the tendency to selectively attend to 
specific stimuli (Morales, Brown, Taber-Thomas, LoBue, Buss, & Pérez-Edgar, 2017). Whereas, other 
experimental research has shown that clinically anxious individuals avoid threat-related material and 
attend more to neutral stimuli compared to non-anxious controls (Coles & Heimberg, 2002; Koster, 
Crombez, Verschuere, Van-Damme, & Wiersema, 2006). In relation to this, it has been suggested that 
anxiety leads to initial hypervigilance towards threat, which is then followed by avoidance in processing 
the threatening stimulus because it is difficult to stay with the anxiety (Koster et al., 2006; Onnis, Dadds, 
& Bryant, 2011). This can lead to a lack of deep processing of threat-relevant information, resulting in 
poorer memory for that information (Koster et al., 2006). Clinicians can use this knowledge when 
treating patients who experience anxiety, as the tendency to avoid processing threat-related information 
plays a key role in the maintenance of the anxiety disorder, thus serving to maintain emotional problems 
(Onnis, Dadds, & Bryant, 2011).        
 Experimental studies examine explicit and implicit memory bias (i.e., conscious and 
unconscious retrieval of information, respectively) using explicit and/or implicit memory measures (Coles 
& Heimberg, 2002; Mitte, 2008). This means that explicit memory bias is revealed by conscious and 
overt measures whereas implicit memory bias can be exposed by covert measures such as fMRI. In 
relation to this, one study investigated memory bias with both explicit and implicit memory measures. 
Thirty-four participants were presented with neutral pseudo-words (e.g. ‘’muxo’’), which were paired with 
aversive or neutral pictures. Memory was assessed by recall and fMRI scans immediately after learning 
and at a 4-day follow up. Results have shown that higher trait anxiety was correlated with stronger 
amygdala activation for negative stimuli significantly more than for neutral stimuli (Eden et al., 2015). 
Research has shown that memory has a central role in the regulation of negative emotion (Tran, 
Joormann, & Hertel, 2011). Specifically, studies suggest that individuals actively retrieve good memories 
as a way of regulating negative mood (Josephson, Singer, & Salovey, 1996). Therefore, memory bias 
operating during the processing of, for example, a dangerous situation can influence the ability to 
regulate emotions which can then lead to susceptibility to anxiety disorders (Joormann, Yoon, & Siemer, 
2009). This means that memory bias can be seen to play a significant role in the onset, maintenance 
and recurrence of anxiety disorders (Tran et al., 2011).       
 The investigation of memory bias in anxiety disorders is essential from both clinical and 
research perspectives for the development of treatment.  Specifically, establishing a better 
understanding of cognitive processes that operate in anxiety-related disorders is important for the 
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purposes of alleviating suffering in clinically anxious individuals and enabling them to improve their 
sense of well-being. Furthermore, greater understanding of how to better process threat-related stimuli 
and by that ensure better control of cognitive biases is in line with the notion of mindfulness which refers 
to being aware of what is happening in the present (Walsh, Balint, Smolira, Fredericksen, & Madsen, 
2008). Mindfulness has been shown in research to have positive outcomes with anxiety in that it moves 
the individual away from rumination, thus enabling them to be more receptive and aware of the present 
(Walsh et al., 2008). This means that better understanding of how to access threat-related stimuli rather 
than avoiding them, can lead to a clearer sense of immersion in the present and may facilitate the 
achievement of better therapeutic outcomes when working with anxiety disorders. 
 Although evidence is strong for attentional bias in anxiety (Bar-Haim et al., 2007), there is mixed 
evidence for memory bias in both implicit and explicit memory bias in anxiety. Indeed, intuitively one 
would expect that the preferential attention towards threat or hypervigilance that characterises anxiety 
(Eysenck, 1992) would lead to better memory performance. However, avoidance, a central component 
in anxiety, may lead anxious individuals to avoid deep processing of threat-relevant information which 
can decrease memory for threat by reducing the amount of encoding or limiting retrieval of threat-
relevant information (White, Ratcliff, & Vasey, 2015).       
 In relation to this it was suggested in an influential model that individuals might show decreased 
processing of threat-relevant material due to avoidance playing a central role in their anxiety (Williams, 
Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988; 1997). This suggests that anxious individuals avoid deep 
processing of threat-related material, leading to impaired memory for threat-related information. 
However, a review on memory bias in anxiety indicated that individuals with anxiety exhibited higher 
memory for threat-related information on free recall tasks (Coles & Heimberg, 2002). Therefore, 
pervasive affect-congruent biases do not appear to extend throughout the entire cognitive system. 
Furthermore, in a recent study it was similarly suggested that anxious individuals are initially 
hypervigilant towards threat-related material but then proceed to adopt avoidance of any deep 
processing because of the discomfort it may cause (Booth, 2017).    
 It is important to distinguish between two stages operating in memory: the encoding stage and 
the retrieval stage. The encoding stage refers to the process whereby information is placed in memory 
whereas the retrieval stage refers to the process of recollecting previously encoded information (Brown 
& Craik, 2000). In one meta-analytic review of memory bias for threat-relevant material in anxiety 
disorders, one hundred and sixty-five studies with clinical and non-clinical samples were investigated 
(Mitte, 2008). Results showed evidence of memory bias in anxious individuals for the recall of threat-
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related information (i.e., anxious individuals remembered more threat-relevant words). However, implicit 
memory bias for anxious individuals was not found. The extent of the memory bias depends on 
experimental procedures such as encoding procedure and retention interval. Furthermore, the clinical 
status of participants was not significantly related to effect size. This means that there was no significant 
difference between participants with anxiety disorders and participants with trait anxiety. A limitation of 
this review lies in the possibility that the findings on implicit memory may be confounded with explicit 
memory processes. For instance, word completion was used to test implicit memory bias, despite the 
inability of the researchers to rule out whether participants used explicit memory strategies to perform 
the task. In relation to this, the current study had used explicit measures of free recall (i.e., recall in any 
order). Mitte’s (2008) meta-analysis suggests a significant relationship between anxiety and recall, in 
turn suggesting that more research is required to further understand memory in anxiety.  In the 
light of the above-cited literature it can be argued that biases in processing threatening stimuli have a 
significant role in the etiology and maintenance of anxiety disorders (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Attentional 
bias towards threat-related stimuli refers to differential attentional allocation towards threatening stimuli 
compared to neutral stimuli (Cisler & Koster, 2010). This means that if threat related information and 
neutral stimuli appear simultaneously, the attention of an anxious person will be biased towards the 
threat-related information (Cisler & Koster, 2010). The attentional system of anxious individuals may be 
uniquely sensitive to and biased in favor of threatening information in their environment. Bar Haim et al. 
(2007) conducted a meta-analytic review, which investigated attentional biases for threat-related stimuli 
in anxiety. The results showed that the bias is evident (with low to medium effect size; d=0.45) when 
using various experimental paradigms and under a variety of experimental conditions both explicitly (i.e., 
consciously recalled) and implicitly (i.e., outside of conscious awareness) in anxious individuals (i.e., 
clinically disordered or individuals high on trait anxiety) and is not seen in non-anxious individuals. 
Consequently, attentional bias in anxiety has robust support in research. The finding of similar effect 
size bias across all the anxiety disorders may indicate that there is a core anxiety component shared by 
them all.          
 Furthermore, there is ample research showing links between memory retrieval and the 
reproduction of the original encoding context (Dewhurst, Conway, & Brandt, 2009; Morris, Bransford, & 
Franks, 1977; Tulving & Thompson, 1973). Specifically, context reinstatement refers to enhanced recall 
of specific information when the context present at the time of encoding the memory and at the time of 
retrieving the memory is the same (Manning, Polyn, Baltuch, Litt, & Kahana, 2011). Furthermore, 
episodic memory refers to a unique recollection of an experience which contains information such as 
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what happened, where and when it took place (Ameen-Ali, Norman, Eacott, & Easton, 2017). It can be 
different from another person’s memory of the same experience, which means that it is a subjective 
experience of recollection (Tulving & Markowitsch, 1998).     
 In relation to this, one recent research study research has shown that context reinstatement is 
important for memory retrieval success (Aksentijevic, 2017). Specifically, It has been shown that 
backwards movement brought participants psychologically closer to the past and specifically to the time 
of encoding which is likely to have reinstated contextual cues, thereby enhancing episodic recollection 
and thus recall (Aksentijevic, 2017). This means that inducing a sense of movement backwards in time 
called ‘past directed time travel’ helps reinstate the encoding context thus facilitating recall (Aksentijevic, 
2017). It is surprising, therefore, that no published study to date has attempted to reinstate the encoding 
context of threat-related material in anxious individuals by inducing participants to mentally travel back 
to the moment of encoding. Therefore, the rationale for the present study is the possibility that some of 
this recall-relevant contextual information could be recaptured by mentally transporting the participant 
back to the moment at which they experienced it.      
 Furthermore, it has been shown recently that one way to reinstate context is to induce mental 
time travel. This refers to the sense of movement in time that can be induced by physical and imaginary 
motion (Botzung, Denkova, & Manning, 2008). Aksentijevic (2017) has shown that induced mental time 
travel (i.e., watching videos of a train moving) can enhance recall when using backward motion. This 
means that using backward vection may induce mental travel which (involuntarily) takes the individual 
back to the moment when they encoded the information. This might help anxious individuals retrieve 
threat-related words and relive the anxiety they felt when they were reading threat words, therefore 
accessing their mood when encoding the memory. However, it is not possible to predict whether the 
memory bias would be away from or towards the threat-relevant words. The impact of vection may be 
related to the notion that memory may be better understood generally in relation to movement 
(Aksentijevic, 2017). Time and space are often perceived both in science and everyday life as two 
distinct entities. However, it is suggested that a better understanding of reality requires that both entities 
be integrated into one superordinate whole (Aksentijevic & Treider, 2016). Bringing memory and space 
together can be done in various ways. The most widely used method is discretisation, which means that 
experience is broken into discrete spatial representations, which are then analysed; for example, 
breaking a film into individual scenes. Discretization of time is widely used in science and is the only 
method of coping with the relation between space and time. Whilst discretization enables a better insight 
into complex processes, it has limitations, for example it cannot explain motion by means of static 
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models (Aksentijevic & Treider, 2016). This explains why vection can provide a good framework for 
understanding the abstract sense of the passing of time.      
 An abstract concept of time is better understood when used in relation to space (Boroditsky & 
Ramscar, 2002). This means that experiencing and thinking about spatial movement has been shown to 
influence the way individuals understand time (Aksentijevic, 2017). Thus, when participants imagine 
moving, they imagine time as moving with them. However, when individuals imagine an object moving 
towards them, they perceive themselves being closer to a future event. This is because the future is 
perceived psychologically as if it is approaching the present, whereas the past recedes from the present 
(Caruso, Boven, Chin, & Ward, 2013). This means that individuals present as having a feeling that they 
are moving with regard to a ‘static’ time whilst others experience time as ‘rushing’ towards them 
(Aksentijevic, 2017).          
 Furthermore, thinking about the future influences posture (i.e., when thinking about the future, 
there is a tendency to lean forward and when thinking about the past there is a tendency to lean 
backwards (Miles, Nind, & McRae, 2010).  Furthermore, it has been shown that individuals are able to 
move relative to time and scientists can observe these effects by using vection (Caruso, Boven, Chin, & 
Ward, 2013). These authors conducted a series of four studies in which they showed that when 
participants were asked to estimate the distance from the present to a real or abstract point in the future 
or past, they underestimated future distance. This may be understood as a similar phenomenon to the 
Doppler effect where there is a change in the perceived pitch of a sound as the source of the sound 
approaches the observer (Doppler, 1842). The third study by Caruso et al. (2013) utilized a sense of 
motion by means of virtual reality (using a head-mounted display). Participants who experienced 
forward vection underestimated future distance in comparison to participants who experienced 
backward vection who tended to overestimate future distance. Thus, backward movement had reduced 
the common tendency for the future to be closer than the past. This means that vection seems mentally 
to relocate participants into the past or the future. This can have potentially important implications for 
therapeutic interventions for anxiety disorders, for example, by helping patients who tend to 
catastrophize future events to see such events as less close to them than is usually perceived by high 
or clinically anxious individuals.          
 Vection is also able to influence the locus of thought (Miles, Karpinska, Lumsden, & McRae, 
2010). The authors showed that participants who were exposed to backward vection, by means of an 
animated star moving either towards or away from the centre of a display on a computer, had thoughts 
about the past. Given that backward vection mentally brings individuals closer to the past in terms of 
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their perception of time, leads to the question of whether backward vection can enhance memory by 
taking individuals back to the point in the past when they encoded information.   
 Furthermore, a recent study has shown that contextual cues are imperative for recollection of 
threat-related material when using vection-based intervention (Aksentijevic, 2017).  It is indeed a well-
known principle that contextual cues facilitate better recollection (Ameen-Ali, Norman, Eacott, & Easton, 
2017). However, the above study has examined this with vection-based intervention for the first time. 
Specifically, this was an experimental study whereby participants were asked to try and remember a list 
of 20 words. They were then given a vection-based intervention, meaning that they watched a train 
moving backwards or forward, or a video of random motion. Finally, they were asked to recall the words 
they had learned. Results showed that individuals recalled more words when they had experienced 
backward motion compared to forward or random motion. This means that going back in time by means 
of inducing a sense of backward motion brought participants back to the time of encoding the list of 
words, so that they recalled more words when experiencing backward vection compared to forward or 
no vection at all. This suggests that contextual cues can be efficiently evoked by means of vection 
based intervention.          
 Thus it appears that bringing back the participant to the stage of encoding (i.e., registering the 
information into memory) should allow them to better recall information at the retrieval stage (i.e., ability 
to access information from the memory) as the context of encoding is the same at both stages. In other 
words, it shows that reinstating encoding conditions at retrieval stage enhances episodic recollection. 
The current study bases its rationale on the importance of context for successful recall, and on the 
significance of mood-congruent memory. This refers to the higher recall of stimuli that carry an 
emotional tone equivalent to the current mood of the individual (Blaney, 1986). For example, depressed 
individuals recalled sadder memories compared to non-depressed participants (Clark & Teasdale, 
1982). It would appear that when individuals learn written information it can have an impact on their 
emotions. Specifically, when threat-related words are processed, the individuals concerned may 
experience some sense of anxiety. Following this, when using vection-based intervention, participants 
can be brought back to the specific context of the encoding situation, so that high-trait anxious 
participants might be able to access the anxious mood resulting from learning threat-related words. 
 The present study examined whether a vection-based intervention can enhance the retrieval of 
threat-related words over and above that for neutral words, thereby counteracting the lack of deep 
encoding of threat-related words in anxious individuals. Consequently, the current study’s original 
contribution to knowledge is the first attempt to explore whether the use of a vection-based intervention 
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(i.e., an induced sense of movement) leads to an improved access to threat-related material in anxious 
individuals. Specifically, the current study aims to explore whether vection-based intervention can 
expose memory bias in individuals with high anxiety trait. This is clinically important as initial vigilance to 
threat-relevant information followed by avoidance might prevent the objective evaluation of threatening 
material, leading to continuing anxiety in already anxious individuals (Coles & Heimberg, 2002). Thus, 
the achievement of better understanding of how vection-based intervention can influence the retrieval of 
threat-relevant information may lead to important progress towards better treatment for anxiety 
















 Anxiety is a common experience across species (Coles & Heimberg, 2002). However, some 
clients present with difficulties managing it whilst others appear better able to do so. As a counselling 
psychologist in training, it seems that I am learning to manage my own anxiety in relation to day-to-day 
anxiety that comes from working with individuals who experience emotional difficulties and traumatic 
experiences. This led me to think that understanding more about anxiety would be beneficial for clients 
as well as clinicians. A recent study has shown that backward vection (i.e., the process of inducing 
perception or sensation of movement) improves recall of neutral words (Aksentijevic & Treider, 2016). 
Also, reinstating at retrieval stage the context that existed at encoding stage is known to enable better 
recall ability (Rinaldi, Locati, Parolin, & Girelli, 2017). This has led to the interesting notion of testing 
whether motion manipulation may affect how anxious (i.e., high-trait anxiety) participants perceive threat 
words. Specifically, linking the sense of movement to memory recall is interesting for me as it provides a 
new perspective on the research of memory bias, thus addressing a research gap since memory in 
anxious individuals has never been tested under the influence of vection based intervention.  
 Furthermore, as a counselling psychologist in training I need to negotiate between my roles as a 
practitioner and a scientist. Reflecting on my development as a practitioner, the use of diagnoses has 
led me to question whether ‘one size fits all’. I do not think that one size can capture the variability in 
experiences and characteristics of individuals that I encounter when working with clients. It is rather 
limiting and restricting to think that there is only one way of conceptualising a client’s problems. I rather 
prefer to position myself in a floating position where I hold in mind various methods of conducting 
research and of theoretical frameworks, hopefully being able to navigate from one to the other according 
to the client’s needs and wishes. In other words, working collaboratively with the client, while at the 
same time being able to work with what is helpful to them individually. However, I am aware that at 
times it is easy to fall into a rather restrictive way of seeing things, as that can be both more containing 
while helping with my own anxiety as a practitioner. This could particularly occur whilst having to 
navigate through times where both myself and the client stumble in our attempts to understand their 
subjective experience. The current climate requires us to measure and provide quantitative data as a 
way of assessing if a client is on their way to recovery. Having a pluralistic point of view therefore 
recognises the diversity around us (Kasket & Gil-Rodriguez, 2011).     
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 A key part of my identity as a counselling psychologist in training is engaging with empirical 
research as well as engaging with psychotherapeutic relationships. In other words, it is important to 
contribute not only in the consulting room but also to research and society. I can see myself drawn to 
quantitative methods as it enables me to use quantifiable measures, which helps me in understanding a 
topic of research. However, I am also drawn to the qualitative way of researching where one can get a 
deeper understanding of how individuals think and feel. For me, either way of conducting research can 
be limiting as it shines light on only one angle of the phenomenon. Therefore, both quantitative and 
qualitative ways of researching are essential so we can understand a phenomenon from various angles.
 I am aware that any research, including this study, sheds light from only one specific 
perspective and therefore is limited in terms of generalising it to everyone. Yet this approach enables a 
micro-investigation of important phenomena. The specific research question that is posed by the current 
study is: ‘Does the use of a vection-based intervention lead to improved access to threat-related 
memories specifically in anxious individuals?’ Answering this requires the employment of quantitative 
methods, as I would need to compare the means of words that are recalled by anxious participants 
compared to controls. Using a mixed methods design could indeed answer the research question and 
go hand in hand with my pragmatism stance. However, due to the limited scope of time, it was not 
feasible and not necessary in order to answer the research question. Furthermore, a qualitative 
approach could have been utilised as well by interviewing participants and asking them on the lived 
experience of dealing with anxiety as well as whether they felt immersed in the videos of movement. 
However, due to the limited scope of time this was not practicable and not necessary in order to answer 
the research question.         
 Therefore, my research philosophy lies with those pragmatists who believe that reality is 
constantly changing in terms of how one interprets it and in relation to the time in history in which it 
takes place; for example, homosexuality was once seen as a mental illness until it was removed from 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) in 1973, whereas nowadays it is much 
more acceptable and not seen as a disorder. Therefore, the stance that I choose to adopt when doing 
research is the pluralistic stance, which posits that there is no single right way, and this approach is an 
important part of counselling psychology (Scotland, 2012). This means that I try to be flexible in my 
epistemological stance and in my espousal of a particular theory of knowledge - in other words, the way 
I endeavor to view reality. I am aware that no matter what method one uses to answer the research 
question, it is limited in that it sheds light on only one specific aspect of the phenomenon.  
 It is important to acknowledge that research takes place within a relationship (Kasket, & Gil-
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Rodriguez, 2011). I aim to provide all participants with a safe and welcoming atmosphere, which mirrors 
the ‘vibe’ that I aim to provide to my clients in the consulting room. This comes from the understanding 
that the research I engage with arises from my practice (i.e., noticing that most patients battle in one 
way or another with anxiety), and that the findings from my research would feed back into my practice 
and enrich it. Therefore, it could be argued that using experimental research would perhaps reduce the 
problems of research subjectivity. However, it is probably impossible to completely remove a 
researcher’s subjectivity in the exploratory process of finding out more about the links between memory 
bias and mental time travel. Being aware of it and aiming to provide the same environment and attitude 
to all participants should help to address this whilst being open to the examination of blind spots.  
 To summarise: I am aware that this is a very new area of research and there is a need for 
further research to be carried out to understand the relationship between memory bias in anxiety and 
mental time travel. However, this study provides a fruitful start to this journey. The research journey in 
this topic is very much in parallel to my own journey as a practitioner where time in history and new 
knowledge generated would continue to evolve and lead me to question and reflect critically on myself 




Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD) 
The present study made use of a sub-clinical group of participants with high trait anxiety. 
Literature on people with GAD is relevant since high trait anxious individuals have a greater tendency to 
develop GAD than other individuals (Penney, Mazmanian, & Rudanycz, 2013). GAD refers to excessive 
and insistent general worry with frequent changes of focus (Aikins & Craske, 2011). It was suggested 
that GAD would be more precisely named as Generalised Worry Disorder in the DSM-5 (Andrews & 
Hobbs, 2010).  GAD is the most frequent presentation in primary care and has the highest lifetime 
prevalence of all anxiety disorders (Somers et al., 2006). It is often co-morbid with physical pain and 
discomfort such as irritable bowel syndrome, sleep difficulty or general sense of annoyance and thus it 
is often presented to practitioners as a somatic symptom (Lowe, Spitzer, Williams, Mussell, Schellberg, 
& Kroenke, 2008). GAD has a lifetime prevalence rate of 4-7% (Newman el al., 2013). It is a disorder of 
prolonged, overpowering worry characterized by physiological symptoms: for example: disturbed sleep, 
muscle tension, and difficulty concentrating. The disorder is associated with a lower rate of full time 
work, social difficulties and increased risk of suicide (Borkovec, Alcaine, & Behar, 2004). 
 Furthermore, it was suggested that GAD should be classified together with Major Depressive 
Disorder since symptoms such as exhaustion and sleeping problems appear common to both disorders 
(Grant et al., 2005; Hendriks et al., 2014). In relation to this the Cognitive Content Specificity model 
argues that these disorders are distinct since individuals with Major Depressive Disorder focus on the 
past and often negatively evaluate themselves, the future and the world around them, whereas 
individuals with GAD focus on thoughts about the future and fears about their ability to cope (Beck, 
Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988).  The Contrast Avoidance Model of GAD is an important model of worry 
in GAD (Newman & Llera, 2011). This model is based on affective contrasts whereby the perception of 
a stimulus can be influenced by its preceding state. Specifically, if a negative stimulus has been 
perceived as threatening it will be experienced as even more threatening by a high-trait anxious 
individual if it is followed by a positive stimulus, and less threatening if it is preceded by a more 
threatening stimulus (Llera & Newman, 2014). For instance, an increase in fear caused by a threatening 
stimulus will be experienced more intensely if preceded by a positive or neutral state, while decreased if 
it is preceded by a similar threatening state.         
 Llera and Newman (2014) conducted a study to test the tenets of the Contrast Avoidance Model 
of GAD. Participants with GAD and a control group of non-anxious participants were randomly allocated 
to engaging-in-worrying, relaxing, or neutral tasks. Specifically, in the worry task, they were told to 
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imagine that which they are most fearful of and then worry about it as intensely as possible. The 
relaxation task involved breathing slowly, while the neutral task was to read neutral information. They 
were then shown fearful, sad or comical videos. Their skin conductance response and self-reported 
emotional experiences were recorded. The results supported the tenets of the Contrast Avoidance 
model. Specifically, people given the worry task were already in a more negative mood than those in the 
other tasks, which led them to avoid the shift in negative emotion in response to a negative video 
compared to the others. Furthermore, all participants experienced an increase in positive emotion 
following the comical video. This may indicate that anxious participants had a stronger positive 
emotional contrast than participants in other conditions. It suggests that the positive emotion may be 
serving as reinforcement in the form of a sense of relief that events turned out to be more positive than 
had been expected.           
 This appears to show that people with GAD are more influenced by negative emotional 
contrasts than non-anxious people and the avoidance of this contrast encourages their worry. Relating 
to this, participants with GAD seemed to prefer to avoid negative emotional contrast whilst the non-
anxious preferred the opposite. It seems likely that anxious people take a negative stance so they can 
better cope with their emotional state relating to threatening situations which, it can be argued, may 
suggest that they use worry as a means of preparing themselves for anticipated negative events. 
 In relation to this the tripartite model suggests that negative emotion is associated with both 
GAD and Major Depressive Disorder but that each disorder consists of a specific unique component 
(Clark & Watson, 1991): Major Depressive Disorder being associated with a feeling of being low in 
mood, and anxiety associated with high arousal (Anderson & Debra, 2008). Research suggests that 
both models together best distinguish between Major Depressive Disorder and GAD (Beck, Benedict, & 
Winkler, 2003). The lifetime prevalence of GAD is about 5.7% (Kessler, Petukhova, Sampson, 
Zaslavsky, & Wittchen, 2005) with individuals experiencing symptoms of GAD between five and ten 
years before they receive a diagnosis (Keller, 2002). This indicates that GAD is unlikely to remit without 
therapy. In terms of gender differences, it appears that the course of GAD seems to be the same in both 
females and males (Campbell et al., 2003) but females are more likely to meet a higher number of DSM 
criteria, whereas males are less likely to seek help than females (Kessler et al., 2005). The impact of 
GAD is argued to be significantly damaging for the individual and have implications for society as a 
whole (Allgulander, 2006). In one study participants with GAD and non-anxious controls completed self-
report questionnaires to do with quality of life, worry and depression symptoms. Results have shown 
that participants with low levels of quality of life were correlated with having GAD. Furthermore, 
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individuals with GAD reported themselves as having lower quality of life than controls (Henning, Turk, 
Mennin, Fresco, & Heimberg, 2007). This shows the significant negative impact which individuals with 
GAD experience in relation to their daily functioning and their relationships.    
 In one study of quality of life, productivity and costs were examined in individuals with GAD 
compared to non-anxious controls, using cost analysis formulas as well as self-reported questionnaires 
such as health related quality of life (HRQoL). It was found that frequency and amount of reduced 
efficiency in the work-place and numbers of sick days taken by individuals with GAD are higher 
compared to the non-anxious and present a significant financial burden to the UK (Toghanian, 
DiBonaventura, Jarbrink, & Locklear, 2014). Additionally, individuals with GAD utilise A&E and hospital 
services more than non-anxious individuals. Furthermore, those with moderate and severe levels of 
GAD used more health care resources than individuals with mild GAD. This shows the significant 
financial impact that GAD has on the economy (Toghanian et al., 2014).     
 The psychological approach to GAD recommended by the National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence (NICE, 2011) consists of drug treatment through selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor 
(SSRI) and/or therapy which is usually Cognitive Behaviour therapy (CBT) either in self-help, group 
settings or in individual therapy. There is significant inconsistency in research findings examining the    
efficacy of CBT for GAD (Hoffman, Asnaani, Vonk, Sawyer, & Fang, 2012). In some studies CBT for 
GAD is linked with significant clinical change but there appear to be no definite long term positive 
benefits (Siev & Chambless, 2007). In one meta-analysis the efficacy of Cognitive Therapy (CT) for 
worry symptoms in GAD was examined. Results have shown that CT had better outcome than no 
intervention at all (Hanrahan, Field, Jones, & Davey, 2013). However, CT efficacy for worry symptoms in 
GAD was lower than that achieved through other therapies (Hanrahan et al., 2013). This indicates that 
CT is effective compared to no intervention at all.  A model for GAD proposed by Wells (2005) argues 
that therapy for GAD needs to put emphasis on maintaining the anxiety rather than trying to reduce 
symptoms, if there are to be long lasting effects. CBT concentrates on questioning the content of the 
worry in GAD but in most cases one worry might well be replaced by another (Wells, 2007). Thus, better 
understanding of the cognitive mechanisms operating in GAD is needed. Furthermore, in a Cochrane 
review on therapy for GAD for adults, twenty-five studies were included comparing CBT to a control 
group, a waiting list group or a no intervention given group, and studies comparing CBT to another 
therapy (Hunot, Churchill, Teixeira, & Silva de Lima, 2007). Results have shown that CBT was better in 
reducing symptoms of anxiety compared to the waiting list or no intervention groups. However, 
evaluation of long-term effects was beyond the scope of the review. When CBT outcomes were 
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compared with other therapies such as psychodynamic therapy results were less conclusive. This 
current review is limited by the lack of definitive research comparing the effectiveness of CBT for GAD 
with that of other therapies.                     
 In an additional meta-analysis examining psychological treatment of GAD results have shown 
that CBT was more effective in reducing symptoms of worry, anxiety and depression compared to 
waiting list (Cuijpers et al., 2014). CBT also had better outcomes at a 12 month follow up compared to 
relaxation techniques only. This shows that CBT can be argued to be effective in relation to GAD 
symptoms, but it is not conclusive whether CBT is superior to other therapies in the treatment of GAD 
(Hunot, Churchill, Teixeira, & Silva de Lima, 2007). It would appear that research findings to date are 
not conclusive in regard to the treatment of GAD. In relation to this, it is suggested that early 
reinforcement of avoiding anxiety provoking situations might play a key role in the maintenance of 
anxiety in GAD (Dadds, Barrett, Rapee, & Ryan, 1996) as well as anxious reactions being learned 
behaviour. It is argued that individuals with high trait anxiety might have been exposed to sudden and 
uncontrollable adverse situations (Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006). Furthermore, individuals with GAD have 
lower tolerance for the fact that the future is unknown (Dugas, Buhr, & Ladoucuer, 2004).  
 The Intolerance of Uncertainty model for GAD includes intolerance of uncertainty, poor problem-
solving skills, worry and cognitive avoidance (Dugas, Gagnon, Ladouceur, & Freeston, 1998). 
Intolerance of uncertainty refers to a tendency which influences how uncertain scenarios are perceived 
and interpreted (Dugas et al., 2004). The difficulty with what the future holds occurs when thinking ‘what 
if?’.  Also, individuals with GAD report perceiving worry as a positive element as it helps them to prepare 
for new and challenging situations. It is also argued that individuals with GAD have a lessened ability to 
problem solve compared with individuals without GAD; and they do not believe in themselves in terms of 
their ability to problem solve. Furthermore, it is argued that individuals with GAD cognitively avoid any 
stimuli that contain worry (Dugas, Marchand, & Ladouceur, 2005).   
 Intolerance of Uncertainty refers to negative emotional, cognitive and behavioural reaction to 
uncertainty (Borkovec, 2002). It is associated with severe level of GAD in comparison to other clinical 
disorders (Boswell, Thompson-Hollands, Farchione, & Barlow, 2013; Gentes & Ruscio, 2011). In the 
limited research evidence for the efficacy of treatments that target Intolerance of Uncertainty, CBT has 
been found to significantly reduce intolerance of uncertainty (Van-der Heiden, Muris, & van der Molen, 
2011). The Intolerance of Uncertainty model was examined in a study conducted by Ladouceur, 
Gosselin and Dugas (2000). Participants were allocated to either high or low intolerance groups. They 
were presented with a gambling computer game whereby the high intolerance group was told that there 
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is a low chance of winning whereas the low intolerance group was told there is higher chance of 
winning. Results have shown that participants experienced higher level of worry in the high intolerance 
compared to the low intolerance group. This suggests that Intolerance of Uncertainty is a key element in 
worry in GAD. Another influential model in GAD is the metacognitive model proposed by Wells (2005). 
This model suggests that individuals with GAD utilise worry as a strategy for coping with the stressful 
event but when worry becomes obstinate and fixed, negative metacognitive beliefs are activated and the 
outcome is ‘worrying about worrying’. This leads to increased anxiety, thought suppression and a need 
for support in an effort to reduce the anxiety. This then leads to the perception that worry is dangerous, 
thus maintaining the vicious worry cycle (Wells, 2005). This means that GAD is maintained by 
experiencing contradicting positive and negative beliefs in relation to worry, with an emphasis on the 
role of metacognitions as central element in this process. It is suggested in this model that individuals 
with GAD interpret the bodily symptoms of anxiety and metacognitions as verification for the damaging 
influence of worrying and therefore they do not think that it is safe to stop worrying (Wells, 2005).  
 One study examined the effects of metacognitive therapy for individuals with GAD (Wells & 
King, 2006). Participants’ anxiety, depression and worry were measured before and after therapy. 
Participants who received CBT in the past were not included in the study. Results have shown that 
participants’ symptoms of anxiety, depression and worry were clinically improved after receiving 
metacognitive therapy both at the end of therapy and at follow-ups. However, a limitation for this study 
comes from the use of only a small sample and it is not clear whether the improvement was solely 
because of metacognitive therapy as half of the participants had additional diagnoses. In relation to this, 
another study explored metacognitive therapy by comparing it with intolerance of uncertainty therapy 
and delayed treatment in individuals with GAD (Van der Heiden et al., 2012). Both metacognitive and 
Intolerance of uncertainty therapy are designed as fourteen structured sessions. Presentation of GAD 
was evaluated before therapy, immediately after therapy and at six months after therapy. Results have 
shown that both metacognitive therapy and intolerance of uncertainty therapy reduced symptoms of 
GAD. Furthermore, metacognitive therapy and intolerance of uncertainty therapy had better outcomes in 
relation to reducing GAD symptoms than delayed therapy. Additionally, participants who experienced 
metacognitive therapy had alleviated their worry in comparison to the level of worry they experienced 
prior to therapy, as indicated by the Penn State Worry questionnaire (Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & 
Borkovec, 1990). This indicates that both metacognitive therapy and intolerance of uncertainty therapy 
were effective in reducing GAD symptoms.       
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An additional important model in GAD is Emotion Dysregulation (Mennin, Heimberg, Turk, & 
Fresco, 2002; Mennin, Turk, Heimberg, & Carmin, 2004), which suggests that individuals with GAD 
experience emotions more intensely than non-anxious individuals. It also hypothesizes that those 
individuals with GAD have a lower understanding of their emotions and have more negative evaluations 
and fear of emotions. Furthermore, individuals with GAD have maladaptive ways of regulating their 
emotions, which leads them to experience more distress than they experienced initially (Mennin, 
Heimberg, Turk, & Fresco, 2005). Therefore, individuals with GAD might feel overwhelmed because of 
the intensity of the emotions they feel which serve to reinforce their fear. It is also postulated that 
individuals with GAD would be either hyper vigilant to threatening stimuli and allocate attention to it, or 
avoid it and without paying any attention to it (Mennin et al., 2005). In other words, individuals with GAD 
would either attempt to control their emotions in order to minimise any exposure to uncomfortable 
emotions or worry excessively in an attempt to regulate their emotions. A limitation to this model is that 
there is no developmental account as to how an individual with GAD might develop a pattern of 
experiencing emotions more strongly than non-anxious individuals.    
 Research suggests that difficulty in managing emotions plays a central role in GAD as well as 
the aversive response to emotions (Mennin et al., 2004). In one study, participants completed daily 
diaries in which they recorded their thoughts and feelings as well as completing a questionnaire 
measuring emotion regulation techniques (called Emotion Regulation Strategies Questionnaire, ERSQ; 
Feldman-Barrett, Gross, Christensen, & Benvenuto, 2001). Results have shown that participants with 
GAD reported more difficulties dealing with emotions compared to controls who were not clinically 
anxious (Decker, Turk, Hess, & Murray, 2007). However, individuals with GAD did not show less ability 
to use emotion regulation techniques compared to controls (Decker et al., 2007). This study finding is in 
contrast to other research surveys that suggest that individuals with GAD have maladaptive 
management of emotions techniques (Marganska, Gallagher, & Miranda, 2013; McLaughlin, Gomez, 





Worry as a key element in the experience of anxiety 
The present study examines memory bias in anxiety in which worry plays a key role and it is 
argued to be a maladaptive cognitive coping mechanism (Moreno, Avila-Souza, Gomes, & Gauer, 
2015). Thus, this section is devoted to ‘worry’. Worry refers to a psychological process in which people 
experience negative thoughts in relation to future events (Moreno, Avila-Souza, Gomes, & Gauer, 
2015). It is further suggested to be a maladaptive cognitive coping strategy which individuals utilise in an 
attempt to prevent or solve future problems (Borkovec, Ray, & Stober, 1998). More specifically, this 
strategy enables the individual to avoid concentrating on the problem, since they are busy worrying in 
relation to the future (Midboe, 2010; Beck, Gayle, Stanley, & Zebb, 1995; Barlow, 2004). Paradoxically, 
worry increases negative affect (Stout, Johnson, Shackman, & Larson, 2015). This can be adaptive as it 
leads the individual to rehearse courses of action in relation to the threatening anticipated events. Worry 
is a fairly common phenomenon, which is related to sense of fear and when experienced to excess, 
might prove harmful (Silverman, LaGreca, & Wasserstein, 1995). It is suggested that worry is a key 
aspect of anxiety disorders as it enhances distress and disturbs daily functioning such as sleep and 
social interactions (Newman, Llera, Erickson, Przeworski, & Castonguy, 2013; Stout et al., 2015).
 Furthermore, anxious individuals consider worry as a strategy for coping with negative affect 
(Newman et al., 2013). Research suggests that worry is a key component of GAD (Kertz, Bigda-Peyton, 
Rosmarin, & Björgvinsson, 2012). Worry is a key part of the diagnostic criteria for GAD (DSM-5, 
American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  It has been repeatedly found in research that individuals with 
GAD perceive their worry as more pervasive and out of their control than individuals who experience 
worry without GAD (Beck, Gayle, Stanley, & Zebb, 1995). Thus, worry generates such a negative affect 
that the person who is high-trait anxious is likely to experience less emotional contrast when facing 
negative information, so that that their subjective perception would be along the lines of ‘if I am feeling 
bad anyway then I can’t possibly feel worse if something bad actually happens’. This suggests that 
anxious people may prefer to maintain worry despite its negative affect, as it is perceived as a defense 
against future threatening situations. Additionally, this can serve as a reinforcement for worry in people 
with GAD as they might feel a great sense of relief if expected negative situations do not happen and 
something positive happens instead (Llera & Newman, 2014).      
 Closely related to this is the experience of severe anxiety, which is an exaggerated response to 
danger without any apparent external threat (Lang & Craske, 1997). Anxiety, like fear, is a shared 
experience between individuals and exists in every stage in life. Mild or occasionally moderate levels of 
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anxiety are normal and can be adaptive (Marks, 1987). However, for some individuals, anxiety can 
become debilitating. Unlike mild anxiety of short duration, severe anxiety can be chronic and lead to 
significant difficulties. When the anxiety experienced is disproportionate to the actual threat, is of 
significant intensity, frequency, and duration, and hinders various aspects of life such as relationships or 
work performance, then it is considered to be a disorder (Norton, & Sears-Edwards, 2017).  
 In relation to this, Lang (1977) suggests that anxiety influences three main aspects: behavioural, 
physiological and cognitive responses. Behavioural responses include avoidance of fearful information, 
scenarios, or environments, which are perceived as threatening. Most individuals with high levels of 
anxiety report the experience of physiological responses such as muscle tension, headaches, nausea, 
palpitations and hyperventilation (Barrios & Hartmann, 1997). The cognitive component of anxiety is 
considered to play a central role in the development and/or maintenance of anxiety. Common cognitive 
features of anxiety include excessive worry, overly self-critical thoughts, attentional biases, interpretive 
biases, while there is mixed evidence regarding memory bias in relation to both towards and away from 
threat (Mitte, 2008).          
 Research suggests that worry may be a cognitive strategy used as a way of overcoming 
difficulties with emotional regulation. In relation to this, the Cognitive Avoidance theory of worry 
(Borkovec et al., 2004) suggests a way to understand the relationship between worry and emotional 
difficulties. This theory proposes that identifying threat creates a problem, which leads the organism to 
find a way to avoid or decrease the risk for survival purposes. If it is impossible to move away or escape 
from the threat-related situation, as, for example, where the threat is internal and not present in the 
external environment, engaging in a cognitive activity is the only way that is left to deal with it. 
Therefore, worry is a cognitive attempt to solve the problem of a future danger since by being so busy 
worrying  one avoids dealing with the danger or the threat in the present.   
 Anxiety disorders are extremely widespread, incapacitating, and linked to considerable 
morbidity and mortality, making them an increasing concern for clinicians as well as public policymakers 
(Stout, Shackman, Johnson, & Larson, 2015; Kessler, Petukhova, Sampson, Zaslavsky, & Wittchen, 
2012). The key characteristic of extreme anxiety (phobic anxiety) is exaggerated worry where there is 
the absence of real danger (Grupe & Nitschke, 2013). Pathological levels of worry, which are a 
significant component of most anxiety disorders, are experienced in the form of repetitive and intrusive 
thoughts relating to threatening future events which impose a great strain on the limited-capacity 
working memory system (Leigh & Hirsch, 2011). Constantly elevated anxiety partially indicates the 
anxious person’s overreliance on maladaptive cognitive coping strategies, including worry (Barlow, 
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2004). Therefore, worry serves as a rather unhelpful approach when attempting to avoid or escape 




















Prevalence Rates of anxiety 
This sub section will explore prevalence rates of anxiety in order to understand how common is 
the experience of anxiety. The prevalence of anxiety disorders is challenging to determine, because 
even minor changes in the diagnostic criteria, interview techniques, or methodology utilized in studies 
may influence the results (Lepine, 2002). A combination of anxiety and depression is the most common 
mental health disorder in the UK with 7.8% of the population experiencing symptoms that warrant 
diagnosis (NICE, 2011). The most recent Psychiatric Morbidity Survey suggests that there are about 
three million individuals with an anxiety disorder (McManus, Meltzer, Brugha, Bebbington, & Jenkins, 
2009). Anxiety disorders inflict high individual and social costs, tend to be long lasting and can be 
debilitating. Specifically, the economic costs of anxiety disorders include emergency care; reduced 
productivity; absence from work; and suicide (Lepine, 2002).     
 Worry seems to occur in the absence of any clear and looming threat. Usually worry represents 
“What if . . .” mental representations of past and possible future events that are common in daily life 
(Borkovec, 1985). These features imply that worry may reflect difficulties in deleting threat-related 
information from working memory (Stout, Shackman, Johnson, & Larson, 2015). Working memory can 
be defined as the system responsible for the transient storage and manipulation of information. It is 
involved in information processing that is required for completing everyday tasks (Derakshan & 
Eysenck, 2009). Working memory comprises short-term memory and processing of the temporarily 
stored information. Short-term memory deals with immediate processing as well as supporting recall of 
information (Baddeley, 2012). When threat-related information enters working memory, it may continue 
to bias attention and memory retrieval even though it is no longer part of the external environment, and 
this serves to promote worry.         
 One novel study examined whether individual differences in worry reflect difficulties deleting 
threat-related information from working memory (Stout, Shackman, Johnson, & Larson, 2015). 
Specifically, they examined whether people with higher levels of worry - measured using the Penn State 
Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990) and the State–Trait Anxiety 
Inventory; Spielberger, 1985) - are less efficient at deleting threat-related information from working 
memory. Participants were presented with threat-related faces and neutral faces. They were then asked 
to remember one or more threat-related face. They found that participants with higher levels of worry 
compared to participants with low levels of worry remembered more threat-related faces than neutral 
stimuli. Furthermore, worry was associated with difficulty in filtering out threat-related faces but not 
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neutral faces from working memory. This suggests that if irrelevant threatening information needlessly 
enters working memory, an individual with high levels of worry will find it difficult to block this compared 
to neutral information. This further shows that prioritizing threat-related information enables worry to 
remain in working memory long after the threat has been removed from the external environment 
(Newman, Llera, Erickson, Przeworski, & Castonguay, 2013). Therefore, the key problem is in blocking 
























In summary, worry refers to thoughts and images that are associated with negative affect and 
somewhat uncontrollable (Midboe, 2010). Worry is argued to be a strategy to problem-solve an issue 
whose outcome is unknown, as there may be a number of negative possible outcomes. Thus, worry is 
closely linked to fear (Torrents-Rodas, Fullana, Bonillo, Caseras, Andion, & Torrubia, 2013; Midboe, 
2010; Beck, Gayle, Stanley, & Zebb, 1995). Fear refers to an evolutionary reaction to perceived or real 
threat in the environment (Panksepp, 1998). Fear creates behavioural and psychological reactions so 
that the individual can evaluate the threat in order to survive and avoid any damage (LeDoux, 1998). 
Threatening stimuli would often lead to defensive reactions such as freezing or avoidance, which will 
also involve physiological arousal (Lang & Bradley, 2010). Fear relates to arousal to forthcoming threat 
whereas anxiety is suggested to be arousal to awaited and predicted future threat (Tovote, Fadok, & 
Luthi, 2015). Both fear and anxiety are seen as adaptive but excessive fear and anxiety can lead to the 
development of anxiety disorder (Kessler et al., 2005). Research has found that individuals with a high-
trait anxious individuals have been found to have a higher risk of developing anxiety disorders (Beesdo, 
Knappe, & Pine, 2009). Furthermore, high trait anxiety is linked to increased arousal to learned threat 
(Browning, Behrens, Jocham, O’Reilly, & Bishop, 2015).       
 The literature on fear distinguishes between fear conditioning and fear extinction. Fear 
conditioning refers to the process whereby one associates neutral stimuli with negative outcome. 
Recurring demonstrations of the neutral cue alongside the aversive result, such as loud noise, will lead 
to a conditioned response of fear to a neutral stimulus (Phelps, Delgado, Nearing, & LeDoux, 2004). 
Relating to this, fear extinction refers to a repeated exposure to the neutral stimulus without the negative 
outcome (for example, without the loud noise), which will lead to extinguishing the association between 
the neutral stimulus, and the adverse outcome (Phelps et al., 2004). In relation to anxiety disorders 
research suggests that the fear extinction process is disturbed in individuals with anxiety who might 
show suspended fear extinction or where fear extinction might not be evident at all (Milad & Quirk, 
2012). Nevertheless, in one recent meta-analysis, little difference was found in fear extinction between 
individuals with anxiety disorder and non-anxious individuals (Duits et al., 2015).   
 Intolerance of uncertainty refers to the tendency which influences how uncertain scenarios are 
perceived and interpreted (Dugas, Buhr & Ladouceur, 2004). High-trait anxious individuals as well as 
individuals with anxiety disorders might find it challenging to accept that they may experience future 
negative situations which might lead them to classify neutral stimuli as possibly threatening (Carleton, 
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Fetzner, Hackl & McEvoy, 2013).  Research suggests that intolerance to uncertainty is found in 
individuals with GAD as well as across the anxiety disorders (Carleton et al., 2013; McEvoy & Mahoney, 
2012). Research additionally suggests that individuals with high trait anxiety or, in other words, 
individuals who are prone to developing anxiety disorder, might generalise threat to both threat-related 


















Working memory refers to capacity-limited storage where information is temporarily kept whilst 
plans are being shaped or implemented (Just & Carpenter 1992); it is linked with representations in 
long-term memory (Cowan, 1999). In relation to this, Baddeley and Hitch (1974) developed a 
multicomponent model of working memory. A three-level system is proposed which consist of two 
secondary systems within a verbal and visuospatial element named the ‘phonological loop’ and 
‘visuospatial sketchpad’ respectively. These enable temporary storage and processing of information 
and they are managed by a ‘central executive’ sub system (Miyake et al., 2000). It was suggested by 
Eysenck (1998) that the working memory acts as a mediator between anxiety and cognition, which has 
led to the development of several theories. The Processing Efficiency Theory differentiated between 
accuracy of task performance and amount of resources invested (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). In relation to 
this, it is proposed that anxiety-related thoughts which are not relevant to the task in hand weaken 
processing efficiency, while worry will cause the individual to be more alert which will counterbalance 
the effect of anxiety. Nevertheless, the processing efficiency theory does not stipulate which executive 
functions are damaged or account for situations whereby anxious individuals are better at a cognitive 
task than non-anxious individuals (Eysenck & Derakshan, 2011).    
 Following the processing efficiency theory, attentional control theory was proposed (Derakshan 
& Eysenck, 2009; Eysenck & Derakshan, 2011). This suggests that anxiety weakens processing 
efficiency and the central executive, irrespective of the task in hand. Furthermore, the inhibition 
mechanism of the central executive is weakened because of ineffective efforts to fight task-irrelevant 
interference. The shifting element of the central executive is also damaged by anxiety as high-anxious 
individuals are argued to struggle to shift their attention from threatening stimuli to the task in hand. 
Lastly, attentional control theory suggests that investing more effort in the task as a way of 
compensating becomes more difficult when the task in hand is challenging and thus will lead to 
reduction in performance compared to non-anxious subjects (Eysenck & Derakshan, 2011). However, 
research findings which support attentional control theory remain inconclusive, with some studies which 






The processing of threat-related stimuli by individuals with anxiety has been associated with a 
distinctive pattern of cognitive biases (Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997). Theory suggests 
(Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Eysenck, 2004) that individuals with anxiety will demonstrate an enhanced 
memory for threat-related material (i.e., memory bias), selectively attending to threat-related information 
(attentional bias) and are thus likely to endorse a threatening interpretation of ambiguous stimuli (i.e., 
interpretative bias).  This cognitive pattern is assumed to lead to exaggerated negative perceptions and 
evaluations, which serves as a key element in the maintenance of anxiety, establishing a vicious cycle 
of cause and effect (Mathews, 1990). Research findings to date have supported this argument, showing 
that attentional biases towards threat-related stimuli are associated with clinical and subclinical anxiety 
using a range of stimuli including words, faces and pictures (Yiend et al., 2015).    
 The present study sets out to test a sub-clinical anxiety group, divided into low and high trait 
anxious subgroups using STAI. It has been shown that individuals with GAD seem to allocate attention 
towards threat-related stimuli and this is more pronounced in individuals showing high anxiety as 
against those individuals with low anxiety (Georgiou, Bleakley, Hayward, Russo, Dutton, Eltiti, & Fox, 
2005). In relation to this, cognitive theories of emotional disorders, including (GAD) suggest that 
cognitive biases (including memory bias) are key factors in the etiology and maintenance of the 
psychopathology (Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). Biases play an important role in increasing the risk of 
the onset, maintenance and, if untreated, the recurrence of a disorder (Yiend et al., 2015). There is a 
substantial amount of research that shows the existence of an attentional bias in anxiety (Mitte, 2008). It 
has been proposed that anxious individuals tend selectively to attend to threatening stimuli (Eysenck, 
2004). Therefore, anxious individuals and those with anxiety disorders selectively attend to negative 
information (Bar Haim et al., 2007). Specifically, threat-related stimuli capture the attention of anxious 
individuals. Furthermore, one study has shown that the memory advantage for threat-related information 
in anxious individuals is not a consequence of response bias (Russo, Whittuck, Roberson, Dutton, 
Georgiou, & Fox, 2007). Since a stimulus that is closely attended to would also mean that it is 
remembered better, one can also expect a memory bias in anxious individuals. However, findings are 
not conclusive, with some research supporting memory bias in anxious individuals with other research 




A review of memory biases across the anxiety disorders 
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM; American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994) uses categorically defined symptoms and examines their impact on functionality to 
warrant clinical diagnoses. The diagnoses are: Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD), Social Phobia 
(SP), Specific Phobia, Panic Disorder with or without Agoraphobia, Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder 
(OCD), and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Individuals with PTSD usually report experiencing 
unwelcome memories in the form of flashbacks of the traumatic event they had experienced. 
Furthermore, individuals with SP can often recount the vivid details of experiencing strong 
embarrassment in public. Individuals with panic disorder (PD) often experience frightening thoughts of 
having a heart attack, which can be perceived as detrimental. This is normally reinforced by 
recollections of their worst panic attack. These examples propose that anxiety disorders are 
characterized by the heightened accessibility of threat-related information. If so, they should be 
associated with a memory bias, or preferential memory, for threatening information.  
 The inconclusive research findings regarding memory bias in anxiety sits in contradiction to 
information models that suggest that there is heightened sensitivity to remembering more threat-relevant 
information in the high-trait anxious compared to the low anxious. Furthermore, it suggests that, despite 
shared features arising in anxiety disorders, the high-trait anxious and low anxious also differ in many 
aspects such as focus of anxiety and age of onset (Coles & Heimbers, 2002). These differences of 
focus may have a role in the mixed findings found in research as well as in studies using different 
methods to test memory bias in anxiety. It is further suggested that the presence of explicit memory 
biases towards threat-relevant information differs according to the type of anxiety disorder.  
 A large body of evidence indicates that explicit memory bias operates in Panic Disorder (Coles 
& Heimbers, 2002). Additionally, there are studies that show support for explicit memory bias in Post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). However, these are few in 
number. There is no support for explicit memory biases in General anxiety disorder (GAD) and Social 
phobia (SP). Nevertheless, there is some evidence for implicit (unintentional retrieval of threat-relevant 
information) memory bias across the anxiety disorders (Coles & Heimbers, 2002). It is therefore 
suggested that when testing anxiety disorders as a whole, there is little evidence for explicit memory 
biases for threatening stimuli and modest support for implicit memory biases (Coles & Heimberg, 2002). 
Nevertheless, investigation of research findings by specific diagnoses shows that various anxiety 
disorders display various degrees of memory bias. Specifically, individuals with PD most commonly 
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show explicit memory biases for threatening information - mainly information that has been deeply 
encoded. Nevertheless, there is very little support for implicit memory biases in PD. Additionally, there is 
little support for both explicit and implicit memory bias for threat-related stimuli in PTSD and OCD. 
Finally, individuals with SP or GAD do not seem to show general explicit memory biases but might be 
influenced by implicit memory biases. 
Interpretive bias 
A large body of research suggests that individuals who are high-trait anxious tend to interpret 
ambiguous scenarios in a threatening way (Tran, Joormann, & Hertel, 2011; MacLeod & Bradley, 1998), 
which leads them to experience anxious reactions to everyday challenges (Macleod, Rutherford, & 
Mathews, 2006). Researchers examined the influence of cognitive interpretive bias on memory (Tran et 
al., 2011). Participants were taught to interpret text, describing ambiguous situations in either a positive 
or negative way. They were then given new descriptions of situations to interpret. Results show that the 
training indeed induced interpretive bias in participants. Importantly, these findings show that 
participants who were trained to have a positive interpretation were more likely to recall never presented 
positive information whilst the individuals who were trained to interpret information negatively were more 
likely to recall never presented negative details. This suggests that interpretive bias may affect 
recollection of information. 
Bower (1981) – this model forms the basis for the present study 
Bower (1981) suggests that the current mood of an individual affects his or her ability to encode 
and retrieve information. This model argues that memories are stored in different locations according to 
mood and that in order to retrieve a memory one has to access the same mood experienced when 
encoding the memory. In relation to anxiety, according to Bower (1981), anxious individuals need to be 
anxious both at encoding and at retrieval if they are to recall more threat-related words. Bower posits 
that the bias towards threat-related information operates when a node (i.e. a representation of an 
emotion) is activated. The node is related to other nodes such as memories. The stimulation of the node 
leads to an increased availability of information congruent with that node.   
 Specifically, this theory proposes that events are denoted in memory as groups of associative 
pathways between various concepts or nodes reflecting the way the individual constructs the event. 
Different emotions have different nodes in memory. Therefore, the individual’s mood at the time of 
encoding memory biases the creation of the memory associative pathways, which leads to a preference 
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for encoding mood-congruent material. Therefore, it is suggested that if mood at recall is the same as it 
was at encoding, recall of mood-congruent material should be greater. A limitation to this theory comes 
from assuming selective encoding and retrieval of threat-related stimuli in anxious individuals but not 
discriminating between (a) implicit memory - that is, a memory that is unintentionally recalled and, (b) 
explicit memory, that is, a memory that is consciously recalled and easily verbalised (Schacter, 1987).  
Beck (1976) Theory that suggests an account for the processing of threat-related stimuli 
Beck (1976) proposed the schema theory, which posits that cognitive processing is guided by 
schemas, which significantly influence how information is attended to, interpreted and remembered. A 
schema refers to a pattern of thinking that helps organise and interpret information. In relation to 
anxiety, this theory suggests that anxious individuals are biased toward threat-relevant material since 
their anxiety primes them to attend more to threat-related material compared to neutral information. 
Consequently, anxious individuals favour threat-relevant information at all stages of processing 
including attention, stimulus, memory and interpretation. Distortion of the schema leads to distortion in 
information processing (Beck et al., 1985, 1979). In anxiety, the schema is typically characterized by 
danger (Kendall & Watson, 1989). Encoding and recall of threat-relevant information is argued to 
happen when the schema is activated. This means that, according to this theory, both encoding and 
recall of threat-relevant information would be facilitated when the relevant schema is activated.  
Refinements on the Beck (1976) model: Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos and Calvo (2007) 
Eysenck et al. (2007) suggest that individuals with anxiety increase the allocation of attention for 
threatening information, which leads to the argument that anxiety reduces the attention that is allocated 
to a current task if it does not involve threat-related stimuli. Specifically, this suggests that when 
individuals consider themselves to be experiencing threat and thus anxiety, they allocate attention 
widely and not specifically to the task in hand. This means that they will have reduced attentional control 
with regard to an ongoing task (Fox, Russo, & Georgiou, 2005). Attentional control theory suggests that 
anxiety influences two central functions: inhibition and shifting. Inhibition refers to the ability to regulate 
an automatic response. Shifting refers to the shift of attention between tasks. Eysenck et al. (2007) 
suggest that anxiety impairs inhibition, meaning that it reduces the extent to which inhibitory 
mechanisms can regulate automatic responses. This can be demonstrated in the difficulty in 
disengaging attention from distracting threat-related stimuli.  
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Beck, Emery and Greenberg (1985) 
The model by Beck, Emery and Greenberg (1985) characterises emotional difficulties through a 
schema. This means that the processing of a stimulus by an individual is facilitated in a way that is 
congruent with the content of an existing schema. More specifically, when a dysfunctional schema 
relating to threat-related information is activated, this leads to the selective processing of information 
congruent with that schema. In anxiety, the content of the schema will be related to danger and difficulty 
in managing threatening situations.  Thus, it can be argued that anxious individuals would remember 
threat-related stimuli better than controls since this is determined by their schema (Mitte, 2008). 
However, there is a discrepancy between the arguments made by the above model and research 
findings which show that that anxious individuals do not always demonstrate memory bias for threat-
related material (Coles & Heimberg, 2002).  
Williams, Watts, Macleod and Mathews (1988, 1997) 
Williams, Watts, Macleod and Mathews (1988) distinguished between integration and 
elaboration, which are both part of the processing of stimuli. It is proposed that integration strengthens 
the structure of the internal representation of a stimulus. For example, even a small part of the stimulus 
will lead to the activation of the whole structure so that the stimulus will enter one’s mind. In contrast, 
elaboration concentrates on the connection between the presented stimulus and other mental 
representations. Since it is more likely that an individual will retrieve a stimulus that has strengthened 
old paths, elaboration is related to explicit memory.      
 Williams et al. (1988) suggested that integration and elaboration are two independent processes 
whereby if a bias occurs in one it will not be associated with a bias in the other. Furthermore, they 
proposed that anxiety relates more to integration than elaboration, which means that anxiety relates 
more to implicit memory than explicit memory. This model argues that a new stimulus is classified as 
low or high threatening by an individual and this depends on the significance of the stimulus itself and 
the state of anxiety of the individual. If the stimulus is classified as threatening, individuals with trait 
anxiety will selectively prefer the processing of this stimulus. By contrast, where elaboration occurs, it is 
either the case that no extra resources are allocated for the processing of a stimulus characterised as 
threatening (which means that anxiety would not lead to increased recall of threat-related stimuli) or 
there is a removal of resources which can lead to worse recall of threatening stimuli in anxiety. Williams 
et al. (1988) suggested that high-anxious individuals would have implicit memory bias rather than 
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explicit memory bias. This model leads to the expectation that anxious individuals would show an 
implicit but not explicit memory bias for threat-related material.    
 Williams et al. (1988) set out to update this model since research evidence has not shown 
implicit memory bias in all studies. However, there is some evidence for explicit memory bias in anxiety. 
The authors differentiated between memorial and non-memorial elaboration. They argued that anxiety is 
related to non-memorial elaboration (i.e., a threatening stimulus evokes feelings of worry in anxious 
individuals but it is not better remembered by these individuals). Furthermore, a stimulus that activates 
memorial activation (i.e., is better remembered by individuals) is not influenced by the person’s level of 
anxiety. Therefore, no relationship between anxiety levels and recall should be found.    
 Williams et al. (1988, 1997) proposed a model that seems to account for the conflicting views of 
some authors, suggesting that anxious individuals are hypervigilant toward threat-relevant stimuli where 
others propose that anxious individuals avoid threat-relevant stimuli. This model posits that anxious 
individuals tend to direct their attention toward threat-relevant stimuli during early, automatic processing 
stages. However, at later and more strategic stages of processing, anxious individuals tend to direct 
their attention away from threat. The attention toward threat-relevant information would heighten the 
anxiety of the individual. However, this would be followed by avoidance of threat-relevant stimuli, which 
would prevent a more elaborated evaluation process that could potentially reduce the perceived danger 
in the threat and lead to reduced anxiety (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). This means that avoiding the threat-
relevant stimuli serves a role in maintaining the anxiety as it prevents a deep evaluation process that 
would lead to the understanding that the stimulus is not as dangerous as initially perceived (Coles & 
Heimberg, 2002).          
 Furthermore, avoidance can decrease prolonged processing of threat-relevant material which 
can lead to decreased memory for threat by reducing the amount of rehearsal in encoding (Koster et al., 
2006). In contrast, White, Ratcliff and Vasey (2015) propose that, since anxious individuals present with 
hypervigilance toward threat-relevant material, their memory for threat should be enhanced as well. This 
is because information that is selectively attended to should be better encoded and hence may lead to 
stronger memories. This may lead to anxious individuals remembering their environment as much more 
threatening than it actually was in reality. Williams et al. (1988, 1997) proposed two cognitive 
mechanisms that are responsible for threat-related bias in anxious individuals. These are: an affective 
decision mechanism (ADM) and a resource allocation mechanism (RAM). The purpose of the ADM is to 
assess how threatening the stimulus is. The RAM receives input from the ADM and decides on resource 
allocation. Consequently, this leads to high trait anxious individuals showing a tendency to orient their 
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attention towards threat whereas low trait anxious individuals shift attention away from threat. 
Furthermore, the direction of attentional resources towards threat increases as anxiety increases 
(interaction hypothesis). Notably, anxiety treatment should focus mainly on the RAM since this is the 
mechanism influencing the bias towards threatening stimuli. Treatment may alleviate anxiety by 
redirecting attentional resources away from the source of threat, a strategy adopted by low trait-anxiety 
participants (Mogg & Bradley, 1998).       
 Williams et al. (1997) introduced key changes to the model whilst keeping central components 
such as the interaction hypothesis. These changes were introduced to accommodate the lack of 
consistency in research findings regarding explicit and implicit memory biases in anxiety. The distinction 
between implicit and explicit memory was changed to a dichotomy of perceptual (i.e. bottom-up) and 
conceptual (i.e. top-down) processing. Confusingly, perceptual and conceptual tests may either be 
explicit or implicit in nature. Indeed, previous cognition and emotion studies did not distinguish between 
perceptual and conceptual processing, by employing explicit conceptual and implicit perceptual tests 
(Williams et al., 1997). This means that there is a need for congruency in the type of processing 
exhibited in the study and test phases for an observed benefit in memory tests to be evident. Indeed, 
failures in controlling the type of cognitive processing used by participants at study and test phases of 
an experiment (Nugent & Mineka, 1994; Roediger & McDermott, 1992) may have been responsible for 
these ambiguous findings. 
Mogg and Bradley (1998) 
Mogg and Bradley’s (1998) theory emphasises attentional bias in anxiety, but it can also be 
used to explain memory bias. They proposed that two systems are operating: one that decides how 
threatening the stimulus is and the second that decides on allocating processing resources. If a stimulus 
is characterised as threatening, individuals will allocate their resources to the threat-related stimulus. 
This model proposes that anxiety is related to the evaluation of the environment as dangerous, rather 
than to the allocation of resources. This means that both high and low anxious individuals would allocate 
a similar amount of resources once a stimulus is classified as dangerous. This further suggests that 
high-trait anxious individuals evaluate more stimuli as dangerous than low anxious individuals but when 
processing threat-related stimuli, both allocate the same amount of resources. A stimulus would be 
classified as dangerous or not in relation to evolutionary adaptation.     
 This model can be applied to memory bias. Memory for threat can be seen as adaptive as it 
enables the learning of sources of threat, resulting in better avoidance of danger and consequently 
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leadings to a greater chance of survival. In a study by Thompson and Pandeirada (2007), a memory for 
survival-related material was found to a greater degree in recall than in recognition. Therefore, it can be 
argued that when a stimulus is evaluated as threatening, it is better remembered as it is adaptive and 
consequently that it is better encoded in memory. It would follow that, according to this model, 
differences in selective memory exist between high and low anxious individuals but these differences 
will disappear once the stimulus is classified as high threatening.     
 In summary, individuals with anxiety demonstrate a variety of information processing biases. 
They are more likely to attend to threat-related than to neutral stimuli; they are more likely to interpret 
ambiguous information as threatening and selectively recall threatening stimuli (Mughal, Walsh, & 
Wilding, 1996). A recent study does not point to different patterns in recall between anxious and non-
anxious individuals (Sanz-Blasco, Miguel-Tobal, & Casado-Morales, 2014). The authors examined 
whether memory is hindered in individuals with high levels of evaluation anxiety compared to low levels 
of evaluation anxiety. Participants were allocated to high and low anxiety groups. They were presented 
with evaluation anxiety content words versus neutral words and asked to recall the words. The results 
showed that there was no difference between recall of evaluation anxiety content words and neutral 
words in individuals with evaluation anxiety. This study, therefore, fails to demonstrate that anxious 
individuals show a different pattern in the recall of threat-relevant information compared with non-
anxious individuals.           
 One recent study tested memory bias with both implicit and explicit measures (Eden et al., 
2015). The authors state that memory bias (i.e., the tendency to recall more threat-relevant words in 
anxious versus non-anxious individuals) is under debate with mixed research findings. Therefore, the 
researchers investigated memory bias with both explicit and implicit memory measures. Thirty-four 
participants were presented with neutral pseudo-words, which were paired with aversive or neutral 
pictures. Memory was assessed by recall and fMRI scans immediately after learning and at four-day 
follow up. The results show that higher trait anxiety is correlated with stronger amygdala activation for 
negative stimuli than for neutral stimuli. This study, therefore, appears to indicate that implicit memory 






This sub-section explores the factors that may be involved in the relationship between anxiety 
and working memory and might, therefore, provide some explanation of the inconsistency in research 
findings in relation to memory bias in anxiety. In one study authors examined the relationship between 
self-control of anxiety and performance in a cognitive task (Bertrams, Englert, Dickhäuser, & 
Baumeister, 2013). Self-control refers to the process of intentionally overriding one’s responses (Inzlicht 
& Schmeichel, 2012). The authors hypothesised that one needs to have a sense of self control in order 
to revert attention from anxiety-related thoughts or worries, as that would distract the individual and thus 
impair performance (Bertrams et al., 2013).        
 In this study, participants’ self-control resources were depleted and their performance was 
compared with that of others whose self-control resources were not depleted. This was done by 
measuring state anxiety using State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, 1985) and exploring its 
influence on verbal learning and arithmetic performance. Self-control resources were manipulated using 
a writing task from Schmeichel (2007), in which participants were asked to write a description of an 
event occurring when they were of school age, while those in the depletion condition were instructed to 
delete letters e and n from their passage. Those in the non-depletion condition were asked to write the 
description of the event without anything else. Results have shown that state anxiety was correlated 
with test performance for individuals who had their self-control resources depleted both on verbal 
learning and arithmetic task. This suggests that ability to control one’s attention by moving it away from 
anxiety-provoking stimuli may improve performance in cognitive tasks. In another study participants 
performed less well on verbal tasks when trying to suppress their anxiety-related thoughts or worries in 
comparison to neutral thoughts (Hallion, Ruscio, & Jha, 2014). This suggests that worry did not impair 
cognitive performance in a verbal task.         
 It was suggested that evaluation anxiety involving negative thoughts which are not relevant to 
the task in hand, as well as task-related worries such as ‘I am not doing well’ has an effect on cognitive 
performance. This was examined in a study which assessed anxiety using a heart rate measure and 
state anxiety using a revised test anxiety scale (Coy, O’Brien, Tabaczynski, Northern, & Charles, 2011). 
Negative irrelevant task thoughts were measured using a cognitive interference questionnaire (Sarason 
& Stoops, 1978). Participants received anxiety-inducing instruction while other participants received 
supportive instructions. Results show that individuals who received anxiety-provoking instructions 
experienced higher frequency of negative irrelevant thoughts which led to poorer performance on the 
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cognitive task compared to participants who received supportive instructions (Coy et al., 2011). This 
suggests that anxiety and irrelevant anxiety-provoking thoughts or worries impair performance on 
cognitive tasks. This supports the processing efficiency theory of Eysenck and Calvo (1992), which 
argues that negative thoughts, which are not relevant to the task in hand, adversely influence working 
memory and thus performance on cognitive tasks.     
 Another factor, which was suggested as likely to impair cognitive performance, is worry. It is 
argued that individuals who worry a lot have less working memory capacity when they experience worry 
whilst trying to complete a cognitive task than individuals who worry less (Hayes, Hirsh, & Mathews, 
2008). Literature also suggests that individuals worry in verbal form (Stokes & Hirsch, 2010). One study 
examined whether verbal worry reduces more working memory capacity than worry induced by images, 
in individuals with high levels of worry compared to individuals with low levels of worry (Leigh & Hirsch, 
2011). Participants engaged with verbal or imagery-based worry tasks, and the performance on these 
tasks of low and high worriers was compared.  Selection into the high worrier group versus the low 
worrier group was based on scores achieved using the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; 
Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990). Results show that those who were higher on worry had less 
working memory capacity in relation to verbal worry compared to imagery, as well as being more 
anxious than those who were less of a worrier (Leigh & Hirsch, 2011).   
 Additionally, the threat of risk of shock has been shown to increase anxiety and thus impair 
working memory on verbal tasks (Lavric, Rippon, & Gray, 2003). Furthermore, it has been suggested 
that performance on verbal tasks, which require working memory, is influenced by the task difficulty or 
cognitive load (Shackman et al., 2006). In relation to this, one study examined the relationship between 
cognitive load and performance on cognitive tasks (Vytal, Cornwell, Letkiewicz  Arkin, & Grillon, 2013). 
Participants’ performance on spatial and verbal tasks of increasing difficulty was compared between 
those who were at threat for risk of shock and those who were not threatened. Results have shown that 
those with risk of shock had poorer performance on both verbal and spatial working memory, which 
refers to memory that is responsible for registering information about the environment and spatial 
orientation (Courtney, Petit, Maisog, Ungerleider, & Haxby, 1998).   
 Another factor, which, it is suggested, may play a role in performance on cognitive tasks, is 
mental effort (Williams, Vickers & Rodrigues, 2002). In one study participants evaluated the meaning of 
emotional stimuli which require attention and working memory resources, whilst worrying that they might 
experience impending pain; as against another group of participants who were not anticipating 
impending pain (Kalisch, Wiech, Critchley, & Dolan, 2006). The cognitive tasks participants were 
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required to perform varied activities, ranging from the less difficult - meaning a low cognitive load - to 
more challenging tasks, entailing a high cognitive load. Results show that participants reported higher 
effort under high cognitive load and high anxiety conditions compared to participants who experienced 
lower cognitive load and low anxiety conditions (Kalisch et al., 2006). Other studies suggest that anxiety 
may lead to increased effort, which can result in better performance on cognitive tasks (Visu-Petra, 
Miclea, & Visu-Petra, 2013). The failure to measure directly mental effort, puts into question any 
interpretations on the relationship between mental effort and performance on cognitive tasks. The 
findings from studies that used induced anxiety and examined its effect on verbal working memory (Coy 
et al., 2011; Hallion et al., 2014; Visu-Petra, Miclea, & Visu-Petra, 2013) suggest that spatial working 
memory was largely intact. This is in line with Attentional Control Theory (Eysenck et al., 2007), which 
suggests that anxiety leads to higher attentional resources invested in threatening stimuli (Eysenck, et 
al., 2007).           
 Furthermore, research findings which suggest that mental effort (Kalisch, Wiech, Critchley, & 
Dolan, 2006; Williams, Vickers, & Rodrigues, 2002) may possibly alleviate any adverse effects of 
anxiety are also in line with Attentional Control Theory. However, Attentional Cognitive Theory is not 
able to provide an explanation for the full pattern of findings. Specifically, anxiety seems only to disrupt 
verbal working memory under conditions of low to moderate cognitive load and not high cognitive load 
(Vytal et al., 2013). Nevertheless, spatial working memory was impaired both when cognitive load was 
high and when it was low to moderate (Vytal et al., 2013). This means that anxiety seems to activate an 
automatic reaction to promote survival via the identification of danger, and this results in restricted 
resources becoming available for spatial working memory. The above studies were well designed to 
examine the relationship between anxiety and memory. Specifically, The threat of shock as a way of 
inducing anxiety seems very effective, as well as being verified through psychological measures of 







Vection as a way to induce Mental time travel 
Atance and O’Neill (2001) introduced the concept of future thinking. They built on Tulving’s 
(1985) definition of episodic and semantic memories. Semantic memory is a general knowledge of the 
world. Lieberman and Trope (2000) posit that individuals view distant future events more abstractly than 
immediate future events. Furthermore, when planning for the future, individuals tend to consider 
obstacles only when it is an immediate future event. This means that individuals may adopt a semantic 
way of thinking about the future rather than an episodic viewpoint, and this may decrease the accuracy 
of their predictions. This would suggest that linking episodic future thinking (i.e. pre-experiencing an 
event) to memory biases in anxiety can help inform better treatment for anxiety disorders.  
 Miles, Karpinska, Lumsden and Macrae (2010) posit that the human ability to pre-experience 
the future based on prior experience is evident across cultures. This is important to the current study as 
perception of the future is linked to movement through space (vection). These researchers investigated 
whether movement through space influences vection. Participants performed a dull task, which was 
expected to create daydreams whilst watching animations with backward vection or forward vection. 
Subjects were asked to report their unrelated thoughts whilst watching the animations. It was found that 
moving back in time encouraged thinking about the past and moving forward in time encouraged 
thinking about the future. These findings further strengthen existing evidence that mental time travel is 
associated with movement in space. A limitation to this study comes from questioning whether the 
effects of vection would transfer to physical movement. It is possible that if participants were required 
physically to move, the effects would be amplified.      
 Caruso, Boven, Chin and Ward (2013) suggest that the reason individuals view the past as 
more distant than the future, despite equivalent objective distance, is parallel to spatial perception. This 
means that the distance between the self and the future decreases, whereas the distance between the 
self and the past increases; just as objects seem spatially distant the further they are positioned from 
the self. This suggests that perceived movement across space is linked to perceived movement across 
time. These researchers conducted an experiment where they manipulated time by going backward in 
time through virtual space. Results show that when going back in time, the perception that future events 
are closer than past events, despite equivalent time distance, was eradicated. This is very important in 
anxiety disorders where individuals view future events negatively which may maintain their anxiety.
 MacLeod and McLaughlin (1995) tested both implicit and explicit memory in individuals with 
GAD and a group of non-anxious controls. Participants were presented with threat-related words and 
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non-threat-related words. The authors used a mixture of tests: in the explicit test, participants were 
presented with words that they had seen before in an initial task which asked participants to name the 
colour of the word and also to say it. The explicit memory task required participants to circle the words 
that they had recognised from before. Lastly, the implicit memory task was to identify words from the 
initial task, but on this occasion some words that had not been presented initially, but were matched in 
length, were used. It was found that individuals with GAD showed implicit memory bias for threat-related 
words whereas there was no difference between clinical participants and controls with regards to explicit 
memory bias for threat-related words. This study shows an implicit and not an explicit memory bias for 
threat-related words, as measured by the recognition task in individuals with GAD. In contrast, a 
subsequent study did show both implicit and explicit memory bias in individuals with GAD in comparison 
to non-anxious controls (MacLeod & McLaughlin, 1995). The current study tested for explicit memory 
bias in individuals with high trait anxiety compared to low trait anxiety as measured by free recall.
 Research suggests that individuals with high trait anxiety perceive that they are more at risk 
than other individuals for experiencing threat-related events (Gasper & Clore, 1998). It was suggested 
that this reflects the frequency of threat-related information occurring in their memory (Hasher & Zacks, 
1984). One study aimed to test how people who differ in trait anxiety monitor threat-related and neutral 
words (Gasper & Clore, 1998). Participants were asked to recall the words they had seen and report the 
number of times they think they had seen each word. The authors used a median split to divide 
participants into high and low anxiety groups following completion of the trait component of the 
Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) (Spielberger, 1985). Individuals with high trait anxiety 
reported a higher number of estimated occurrences of threat-related words than participants with low 
anxiety. Both groups reported similar frequencies of neutral words. Furthermore, both groups recalled 
more threat-related words than neutral words (Kverno, 2000). This reflects the non-conclusive findings 
that research presents in regards to recall of threat-related words in anxious and non-anxious 
individuals. More research is needed to understand further the mechanisms that operate in memory for 
threat-related words in anxious and non-anxious individuals. Specifically, understanding the relationship 
between vection based intervention and memory in anxiety is needed.    
 In relation to anxiety as a key aspect of the current study, it is important to think about worry. 
Since the key feature of anxiety is worrying about future threat as well as rumination, which is typically 
directed at past negative events and losses (Fox, Dutton, Yates, Georgiou, & Mouchlianitis, 2015), thus 
making temporal psychological distance (i.e. the perception of the distance in time from present to a 
point in the future and in the past) an important factor in anxiety. A good understanding of the links 
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between the way people in their present relate to their future and past selves is important for 
psychotherapy practice (Crossley, 2000). Anxiety is associated with events in time (Eysenck, Payne, & 
Santos, 2006). Specifically, the clinical hypothesis is that anxiety is associated with future threat-related 
events whilst depression is associated with past loss (Wenze, Kathleen, Gunthert, Ramaris, & German, 
2012). Furthermore, a very recent study attempted to explore whether people with anxiety traits would 
demonstrate a more pronounced tendency to perceive the future as closer than the past in comparison 
to controls and whether people with depressive traits would perceive the past as closer than the future 
compared to controls. Students were recruited and divided into an anxiety traits group; a depressive 
traits group and a control group who did not meet the clinical threshold for anxiety or depressive traits. 
They were asked to rate one month ahead and one month ago from, 1) being ‘really close to present’ to 
10), being ‘really far from present’. The authors used the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory 
(MMPI-2-RF), which is a psychological scale that assesses psychopathology including anxiety and 
depression traits. The results showed that the predisposition to perceive future events as closer than 
past events was much more pronounced in participants with anxiety traits compared to controls.  
 In contrast, participants with depressive traits demonstrated a much-reduced tendency to 
perceive the future as closer than the past compared to controls (Rinaldi, Locati, Parolin, & Girelli, 
2017). This was the first empirical study that provides support for the clinical hypothesis that the past 
and future are perceived differently by individuals with anxiety traits compared to people with depressive 
traits. This can help to inform psychological practitioners when providing interventions for people with 
anxiety and depressive symptoms by helping them to think about the actual distance in time of life 
events. A limitation to this study comes from not exploring how the perception of psychological distance 
may differ in anxiety and depression depending on the severity of the event that is imagined. 
Specifically, not asking participants to imagine themselves in a negative versus positive future and past 
event, can be seen as a limitation to this study. However, this study may present a positive starting point 
in a very new area of research.          
 In relation to this, a recent study by Siedlecka, Capper and Denson (2015) investigated 
temporal psychological distance (i.e., the subjective judgment of distance in time or space or, in other 
words, how near or far an event feels from the present moment) in relation to the intensity of an 
emotional event. In the first study the links between anger and guilty rumination on past experiences to 
the perception of temporal psychological distance. Specifically, participants were asked to recall a time 
when they felt angry and/or guilty when going food shopping in the last year. Participants were then 
asked how often they thought about this event, how they felt and what their perception was of temporal 
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distance. The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) was used to report feelings at the time of 
the scenario. The temporal distance was measured by using three questions. The first question asked 
participants how close or far away the event felt to them rating between 1, ‘very close’, to 7, ‘feels very 
far away’. The second question asked how long ago in time the event felt, rating 1 as ‘very recent’ to 7, 
‘feels very long ago’. Finally, they were asked how near or distant in time the event felt, rating 1 ‘as very 
near’ to 7, ‘feels very distant’. The results showed that when people experience negative emotions such 
as anger, guilt and sadness, which then leads to rumination, they experience reduced temporal 
psychological distance (i.e., they perceive the past event as if it were yesterday where in fact it 
happened further away in the past).         
 This has clinical implications, for instance when people experience guilt for surviving a car crash 
when others in the car have died. The guilty rumination keeps the memory very vivid, which hinders 
recovery. Therefore, gaining better understanding of the relationship between memory and temporal 
psychological distance in negative life events can be beneficial for clients with trauma, anxiety and/or 
depression. A limitation of this study comes from not yet knowing the direction of the effect (i.e., whether 
individuals might ruminate about negative life scenarios because they have reduced temporal 
psychological distance or, in other words, because they feel closer to the past).   
 Psychologists have begun to understand the interdependence of space and time (Uttal, 2014). It 
has been shown that mental time travel can be stimulated by either a physical sense of movement or an 
imaginary one (Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002; Caruso et al., 2013; Miles, Nind, & McRae, 2010). 
Furthermore, the recall of a scenario encompasses episodic recollection of a particular context such as 
environmental and emotional states. Specifically, a large body of research has shown that the ability to 
recall stimuli correctly depends not only on replicating the environmental conditions at encoding and 
retrieval (Morris et al., 1977; Tulving & Thompson, 1973) but also restoring encoding operations as 







Review on context for memory retrieval 
During retrieval, the individual is searching for target memory, which in the present study would 
be the part of the experiment where participants were asked to recall the words they learned in any 
order. In relation to this, one needs to use retrieval cues for accessing the memory. Retrieval cues refer 
to small part of information that allows the individual to access the memory. For example: in the current 
study, the retrieval cue would be being asked to recall memory from today.  Therefore, retrieval is a 
succession from one or more retrieval cues to a target memory. Cues help to retrieve memory because 
associations link memories to one another. This means that retrieval is a progression from one or more 
cues to target memory via associations (Baddeley et al., 2010). Following this idea, if the target memory 
receives a sufficient amount of activation from the retrieval cues, the memory will be retrieved. Retrieval 
does not occur if the individual does not attend to the cues. For example: in the current study if a 
participant does not attend to the cues at all or does not invest enough attention in the cues (e.g. 
remembering the situation where they were attending to the words and tried to remember them) then 
retrieval would not be successful. This idea is supported in a study that asked participants to recall 
words whilst at the same time making judgements about different items being shown on a screen. This 
resulted in an impaired retrieval rate compared to controls who were asked to recall the words without 
doing an additional task (Moscovitch & Westmacott, 2003). It would follow that dividing attention is likely 
to reduce retrieval success.         
 An important, well-established concept in the study of memory is the encoding specificity 
principle, which refers to the idea that for a retrieval cue to be helpful in retrieving memory, it needs to 
be present at encoding. Or, in other words, the more similar the cues at retrieval to the cues presented 
at encoding the higher the recall. One classic experiment on context-dependent memory presented 
participants with a list of sentences including either ‘the man lifted the piano’ or ‘the man tuned the 
piano’. After a 3 minutes’ break, participants were given cues such as ‘something heavy’. They were 
then asked to write all the nouns from the presented sentences in relation to each cue. Results have 
shown that ‘something heavy’ was a useful cue when piano was encoded in the context of lifting a piano 
but not when it was tuned (Barclay, Bransford, Franks, McCarrell, & Nitsch, 1974). These findings reflect 
the idea of encoding specificity hypothesis as only information that was involved at encoding left a 
memory trace meaning that only cues that are relevant to this information would be helpful for their 
retrieval. Research suggests that cues are important for facilitating recall. In one study participants were 
presented with target words, which they were later asked to recall. Each word was presented with a cue 
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that had a weak association to it (for example, chair and glue). After encoding, participants were asked 
to recall the words helped by the cue words, which were presented, with the target words. Other, control 
participants, were not shown the cue words. Results have shown that cue words significantly increased 
the recall of target words (Tulving & Osler, 1968) and this has been replicated in recent studies (Tulving, 
2014; Hunt, Smith, & Toth, 2016). This study further showed that despite the logical association 
between table and chair, participants who were shown the target word chair and cue word glue had 
higher recall rate when shown the cue word glue compared to table. This suggests that it is the cue 
word that is associated with the target word at encoding stage that is powerful and significant for 
retrieval and not the obvious associated word (Tulving & Thomson, 1973).  
 Retrieval would not be facilitated if cues were weak despite being relevant. It is the strength of 
association of one memory to others that influence the activation that spreads between cue and target 
memory, which then lead enables the memory to be retrieved. Research suggests that incorporating 
duel cuing such as semantic and rhyme cues improved recall rates compared to the control group who 
received no cues (Rubin & Wallace, 1989). Furthermore, it can be argued that recall is based on our 
perspective of the situation. For example, in one study participants were asked to recall the items of a 
house from the perspective of a home buyer versus a burglar. Results have shown that participants 
recalled more words relevant to the perspective they adopted (Anderson & Pritchert, 1978). This means 
that one’s perspective provides a structure or a schema that influences retrieval leading to retrieval of 
things that are relevant to the schema. Following on from the current study, future studies might ask 
participants who are high on anxiety trait to recall words from the perspective of someone who 
experiences an emergency situation, such as being injured in an accident. This would be compared to 
participants with low anxiety trait, who would be asked to adopt a neutral perspective such as asking 
them to recall words from the perspective of a person sitting on a bench in a leafy park, which might 
lead to different recall rates.        
 Additionally, the strength of encoding is important (Baddeley et al., 2010). This means that even 
with a relevant cue, the target memory might not be retrieved because of weakly encoded initial 
memory. Words vary with the frequency of their use. For example, ‘meal’ is more frequent than ‘helmet’.  
Higher frequency words seem to be better recalled (Baddeley et al., 2010). A possible explanation for 
this is that words that are more frequent are better encoded due to their repeated exposure, which then 
leads to better recall. In relation to the current study, individuals with high anxiety might steer away from 
these words and have low exposure, which might then result in no significant difference in recall 
compared to individuals with low anxiety. Humans are surrounded by associations to the past; 
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nevertheless, they are not constantly reminded by memories, but only occasionally. Thus, it is 
suggested that in some instances, in order to be able to retrieve memories, one has to be in the right 
frame of mind or in the retrieval mode (Tulving, 1983). One study examined retrieval mode by 
measuring brain activity during retrieval. Participants learned list of words appearing on either the left or 
right-hand side of a computer screen. In the second part of the experiment they were shown the words 
mixed with new words and were requested to complete two tasks. The first task was to decide whether 
they had seen the word before and if so on which side of the computer screen.    
 The second task was to evaluate whether the word referred to an object that can move on its 
own such as buzzard. Participants’ brain activity was recorded whilst they were making the evaluation 
which meant that the researchers could see if there was specific brain activity linked to getting ready for 
retrieval. Results show that there was greater brain activity in the frontal cortex, which is involved in 
attentional control, when participants were getting ready to retrieve (Herron & Wilding, 2006). This 
suggests that for effective retrieval it is important to ensure that words will be processed as probes of 
episodic memory. This also suggests that retrieval is improved by enabling participants to arrive at the 
right frame of mind, which is accomplished by the prefrontal cortex. In relation to the current study 
perhaps future research might record brain activity whilst administering vection-based intervention to 
examine if there was higher activity in the prefrontal cortex, which would mean that participants might be 
in retrieval mode, and thus improve retrieval performance.      
 Research has established that context cue is important for success of recall (Baddeley et al., 
2010). The current study not only reproduced the context but also brought the participant back to the 
context by means of vection-based intervention, or in other words by inducing a sense of movement. 
Furthermore, the mood context of the encoding event is argued to be experienced as bringing 
participants back to the encoding stage which would thus elicit their mood at encoding. Explicit memory 
tests refer to memory tasks that overtly ask individuals to retrieve past events (Richardson-Klavehn, & 
Bjork, 1988). Free recall relies on context, since the task is to retrieve words in any order without any 
overt cues. Contrary to this, cued recall may for example provide an association of a previously studied 
word or the first letter of a word as a cue, thus recalling words in response to a cue. In the present 
study, the central idea was to test memory under the context in which it was encoded. This suggests 
that free recall is the best way to test it as it relies on context the most heavily.   
 Another type of direct memory test is the recognition test, which require the participant to state if 
they have encountered the stimulus before in the experiment, or not. This comes with clear limitations, 
as, for example, in eyewitness situations, where memory can prove inaccurate. The other way to test 
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memory is by using indirect memory tests, which test the memory without directly asking the participant 
to recall the past. For example, participants would first be presented with words and would later be 
presented with the previous words mixed with new words that are non-words (a string of letters with no 
meaning) asking them to decide which one is a real word (Baddeley, Eysenck, & Anderson, 2010). 
 This means that indirect tests require the individual to perform a task that on the face of it does 
not seem to be testing memory. Other ways to test memory indirectly are word-stem completion and the 
presentation of words briefly followed by a visual mask, and asking participants to say the word they 
saw. In conclusion, because indirect memory tests do not require recall of the past, context is not used 
as a cue meaning only cues such as the first letter of the word are used intentionally. One would expect 
recall performance to be lower than in direct memory tests because of the absence of context cues. 
However, recent exposure to the stimulus as part of indirect memory tests appears to improve 
performance, which is called repetition priming (Ochsner, Chiu, & Schacter, 1998). In the current study, 
bringing back the participant to the context of encoding, to check for recall performance as a 
comparison between low and high anxiety states, is the key idea of the study. Thus, context-dependent 
memory, which means bringing back the participant to the environment and mood they experienced in 
encoding, is central to the current study. This is because returning to the original environment reinstates 
the spatial context in which the event was originally encoded, thus aiding retrieval (Godden & Baddeley, 
1975). With these findings in mind, indirect measures, specifically free recall, have been employed.
 In one experiment, divers listened to words on the beach and underwater and were asked to 
recall them in the same environment versus the other one. Results have shown that stimuli learned 
underwater were better recalled underwater and stimuli learned on the beach were better recalled on 
the beach (Godden & Baddeley, 1975). This shows that context dependent memory indeed occurs. A 
more recent study asked participants to learn and recall words in the same room compared to 
participants who were moved to a different room at retrieval. Results have shown that the context 
change reduced the recall in that group asked to recall the words in a different room from where they 
encoded the words, compared to the group that stayed in the same room throughout the experiment 
(Aslan, Samenieh, Staudigl, & Bäuml, 2010).  This would suggest that changing the environment 
context at encoding impacts on episodic memory. Furthermore, a review on context dependent memory 
suggested that individuals need to pay attention to the physical environment during encoding (Smith & 
vela, 2001).  Specifically, it was suggested that focus of attention during encoding reduces or eliminates 
any incidental context effects and increases retrieval success. An example for the importance of 
incidental context effects is state dependent memory, such as the influence of drugs on memory. In one 
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study, heavy drinkers were asked to hide money whilst they were classified as drunk. Once sober, they 
could not remember where they had hidden the money. However, when they were drunk again, they 
were able to remember where they had hidden it (Goodwin et al., 1969).     
 This finding is seen only when memory is tested by recall (Eich, 1980), as in recognition tests 
search is not necessary. In another study, participants learned a list of words whilst resting on a cycling 
bike, versus pedalling on an exercise bike. Results showed that individuals who recalled the words in 
the same physiological state recalled 20% more words than participants who did not reinstate the 
episodic context (Miles & Hardman, 1998). These results demonstrate that aspects of our physiological 
state are encoded incidentally at encoding stage and re-creation of these aspects in retrieval assists 
memory. A recent study has shown that backward vection improved recall of neutral words 
(Aksentijevic, 2017). Thus, in the current study bringing back the participant to the encoding stage via 
















It could indeed be expected that a preferential attention towards threat (i.e., hypervigilance) 
characterising anxiety (Eysenck, 1992) would lead to better memory performance (Coles & Heimberg, 
2002). Nevertheless, avoidance, a central component in anxiety, may lead anxious individuals to escape 
the deep processing of threat-relevant information, which serves to decrease memory for threat by 
reducing the amount of encoding or limiting the retrieval of threat-relevant information (White, Ratcliff & 
Vasey, 2015). The theory proposed by Williams et al. (1988, 1997) seems to reconcile the conflicting 
views of some authors who suggest that anxious people are hypervigilant towards threat-relevant stimuli 
while others propose that anxious people avoid threat-relevant stimuli. This integrated view posits that 
anxious people tend to direct their attention towards threat-relevant stimuli during early, automatic 
processing stages. However, at later, and more strategic stages of processing, anxious individuals tend 
to direct their attention away from threat. The attention toward threat-relevant information would 
heighten the anxiety of the individual. However, this would be followed by the avoidance of threat-
relevant stimuli, preventing the more elaborated evaluation process that could potentially reduce the 
perceived danger in the threat and lead to reduced anxiety (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). 
 Another important theory, which supports the current study, is Bower’s (1981). This suggests 
that the current mood of an individual affects his or her ability to encode and retrieve information.  It can 
be argued that memories are stored in different locations according to the individual’s current emotional 
state. This theory suggests that in order to retrieve a memory, one has to access the same mood as 
experienced when encoding the memory. In respect of anxiety, according to Bower (1981), anxious 
individuals need to be anxious both at encoding and at retrieval stages if they are to recall more threat-
related words. Following this, it can be argued that high-anxious individuals would experience anxiety 
when presented with threat-related words at encoding. Later, when mentally reminded of the encoding 
stage, they could access their original anxious mood, which served to facilitate recall. This process 
might help anxious people re-experience the anxiety felt when they were initially reading the threat 
words, thereby accessing their mood at the point of encoding the memory. Therefore, a memory bias 
may be seen in the process of backward motion, as this mentally replicates the encoding process. 
However, it is not possible to predict whether the memory bias would be away from the threat, where 
avoidance would play a key role. In this case, the recall of threat-related rather than neutral words would 
not be higher in anxious individuals compared to the low anxious, or vice-versa. If the memory bias is 
away from threatening material it would be expected to result in a lower recall of threat words in the 
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high-trait anxious compared to the low anxious. If, however, the bias is towards threat-related material, a 
higher recall of threat words would be expected in high-trait anxious compared to low anxious persons. 
Furthermore, it is well established in memory research that contextual cues are important for both the 
quality and the quantity of recall (Klein, 2015).        
 Based on the importance of context for recall, a recent study sought to reinstate participants to 
the point of encoding (Aksentijevic, 2017). This was achieved through vection, the process of inducing a 
perception or sensation of movement by watching a video of a train moving backward or forward; or 
through viewing film of the random flight of birds. Participants who had learned neutral words at the 
encoding stage, were asked to try and remember them and to recall the words following the vection-
based intervention. The underlying hypothesis was that backward vection would bring the participant 
closer to the encoding context, thus facilitating recall. Results show that participants who experienced 
backward vection recalled more words than participants who experienced forward vection or random 
motion (Aksentijevic, 2017). This reveals that contextual cues can be evoked by means of vection based 
intervention.           
 In previous research this process has been tested by reproducing at the time of recall the 
original context present at the time of encoding. However, only one study attempted to bring participants 
mentally back to the point of encoding using vection-based intervention. The subsequent results showed 
higher recall of words for participants who experienced backward vection compared to forward vection 
and random vection (random movement). It was suggested that the backward vection brought 
participants closer to the encoding context thus facilitating recall (Aksentijevic, 2017). The study did not 
test the role of anxiety in relation to recall, when individuals are given vection-based intervention. This 
has led the present study to explore whether vection-based intervention would influence the recall of 











This study is the first experiment to test if vection based intervention can reveal any memory 
bias in high-trait anxious individuals.  It is important to highlight that there is tension with regards to 
being able to predict the direction of the current experiment results since threat related words could lead 
to having a strong imprint on memory, which might mean that it is easier to retrieve these words. 
However, at the same time emotional words can induce anxiety, which would mean that the individual’s 
focus is narrow and thus it might be difficult to retrieve the information. Therefore, this study is 
exploratory and the rationale for it is based on the following literature:    
 Bower (1987) proposed that memories are stored in different locations according to mood the 
individual is experiencing. Thus, in order to retrieve memory, one has to access the same mood 
experienced at encoding  (mood congruent recall). A limitation to this theory comes from not 
discriminating between explicit memory (consciously recalled) and implicit memory (unintentionally 
recalled). Another influential theory proposed by Williams et al. (1997) suggest that high-trait anxious 
tend to direct their attention towards threatening stimuli during early, automatic processing stages, 
which will heighten their anxiety. At a later stage of the processing high-trait anxious direct their 
attention away from threat, which means that they avoid it and thus a more elaborated, objective and 
deep processing of the threatening stimuli is prevented from taking place. A limitation to this model is 
that it does not specify how long it takes for high-trait anxious to move from direction attention towards 
the threat related stimuli versus directing attention away from the threat related stimuli. Intuitively, one 
would think that this is a very rapid process.        
 Boroditsky and Ramscar (2002) had shown that spatial movement affects our perception of 
time. Specifically, participants reported feeling moving with time when they experienced sensation of 
movement (imaginary). Thus, research uses movement through space in order to study time. Given that 
mental time travel can be induced by physical and imaginary motion (e.g. Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002) 
and vection (Caruso et al., 2013, study 3; Miles, Nind & McRae, 2010), any of these methods could be 
used to take a participant “back” to the moment of encoding. In the current experiment vection based 
intervention was used. Additionally, Caruso et al. (2013) suggested that all humans have the tendency 
to view the future as closer than the past. This is because we perceive the future as approaching us 
whilst the past receding from us.  It was shown that this tendency is amplified in high-trait anxious 
(Rinaldi et al., 2017). Moreover, Miles et al. (2010) showed that the sensation of moving forward led 
individuals to think more about the future whereas backward vection led them to think more about the 
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past.  This suggests that perceived movement across space is linked to perceived movement across 
time. Perhaps vection can help high-trait anxious to objectively evaluate the distance into the future, 
which may affect the tendency to catastrophize future events and thus reduce anxiety.  
 Another central idea, which the current study is based on, is the notion of context dependent 
memory. This refers to the well-known principle that returning to the original environment reinstates the 
spatial context in which the event was originally encoded thus aiding retrieval (Goddon & Baddeley, 
1975). Specifically, it was shown that divers who learned words under water versus on a beach were 
better able to recall these words if the learning place and retrieval place was the same (Goddon & 
Baddeley, 1975).         
 Furthermore, a recent manuscript in preparation had showed that backward vection enhanced 
recall of neutral words (Aksentijevic, 2017). Specifically, it has shown that backward vection led to 
higher recall of neutral words in comparison to forward vection (videos) or random motion. This 
suggests that backward vection brought participants back in time psychologically to the moment of 
encoding thus re-instating context dependent memory and aiding retrieval.  To summarise, the current 
experiment is exploratory by nature and it is hoped that backward vection would bring participants back 
to the moment of encoding by accessing the anxiety they might have felt at encoding, when presented 
with threatening words thus reinstating specific context dependent memory (mood congruent recall). 
Thus, this might counteract the avoidance and consequently lead to better memory for threat words in 





The current study was approved by the departmental ethics committee and was carried out in 
accordance with the provisions of the World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki. This study 
aimed to examine whether motion manipulation affected how anxious (i.e., high-trait anxiety) 
participants perceive threat words. This question was investigated using a 3 x 2 between-subjects 
design on the number of remembered threat words. There are two independent variables (a. motion 
condition- forward, backward and no motion and b. trait anxiety group-high and low). There are two 
dependent variables: number of correct words and number of threat words. Furthermore, the STAI 
anxiety questionnaire state component was administrated both at the beginning and at the end of the 
experiment to check if participants’ current anxiety state changed during the experiment. Furthermore, 
the STAI anxiety questionnaire trait component was administrated once at the beginning of the 
experiment. This required a within-subjects t test and was not part of the main analysis.  
Hypothesis  
Recent study has shown that backward vection improves recall of neutral words (Aksentijevic, 
2017). The aim of this study is to explore whether vection affects recall of threat related words in 
individuals with high trait anxiety. However, it was not possible to predict whether the memory bias 
would be away from the threat (i.e. later stage processing influence this) or towards the threat-relevant 
words (i.e. episodic cues strengthen the initial attentional bias towards threat-relevant words). If the bias 
was away from threatening material it would have been expected to see lower recall of threat words in 
high-trait anxious compared to low anxiety condition. If, however, the bias was towards threat related 
material it would have been expected to see higher recall of threat words in high-trait anxious compared 
to low anxiety condition. 
Participants.    
 Ninety undergraduate students took part in the study. The majority of the sample was female (n 
= 85; 94.4%). The ages of the participants ranged from 18 years to 53 years (M = 20.44, SD = 5.39). An 
a priori power analysis using G*Power software (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) indicated that 
the sample of 90 was sufficient to detect large effects (f = .40) at p = .005 with a power of .80. 
Participants were recruited through the online booking system or through personal contact and were 
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offered course credits for their participation. Three participants were distinctly older than the rest of the 
sample (43, 46 and 53 years). Fifty-nine participants (65.6%) had English as their first language. All 
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and all provided informed consent and received 
credits for taking part in the study. Participants were assigned to three motion direction groups (forward, 
backward and no motion). It should be noted that it was not possible to randomly assign participants 
due to the repeated state component of the anxiety questionnaire. However, a list whereby it was 
indicated how many participants were allocated to each motion direction group was used to maintain 
balance among the groups in terms of age, gender and EFL (Bhat, 2001). Furthermore, at the end of the 
experiment participants were allocated into high and low anxiety groups using median split.  
Design.      A 3 x 2 between-subject design was used with two independent variables: a. motion 
with three levels: forward, backward and no motion and b. trait anxiety with two levels—high and low 
anxiety. 
Materials and apparatus.      The Spielberger trait anxiety questionnaire (STAI) scale, 
(Spielberger, 1983) was used to assess trait and state anxiety. This is a self-report questionnaire, which 
has two components: state and trait anxiety. Specifically, the state is designed to measure anxiety ‘right 
now’ (Julian, 2011). It contains items that measure feelings of tension and worry and includes items 
such as: ‘’I feel strained’’ and ‘‘I am worried’’.  By contrast, the trait component measures relatively 
stable characteristics of anxiety and contains items such as: ‘‘I worry too much over something that 
doesn’t really matter’’ and ‘’I feel nervous and restless’’. The STAI questionnaire has a test-retest 
reliability range between 0.68 and 0.77. It also has internal consistency with Cronbach’s alpha of about 
0.9 in both males and females (Waldhauser, Johansson, Backstrom, & Mecklinger, 2011). The STAI has 
40 items, 20 items in each sub scale. Responses for the state component range from 1) not at all, 2) 
somewhat, 3) moderately so, and 4) very much so. Furthermore, responses for the trait anxiety scale 
range from 1) almost never, 2) sometimes, 3) often, and 4) almost always. This questionnaire was 
administrated with pen and paper.  In terms of scoring, items were added in order to get a total score 
including reverse worded items, which represent the absence of anxiety such as ‘I am happy’. Scores 
for each sub scale can range from 20-80, with the higher score signifying higher anxiety. Participants 
were asked to fill in both trait and state components of the STAI at the beginning of the experiment. 
However, at the end of the experiment they were asked to fill in only the state component in order to 
monitor whether their anxiety increased because of the experiment. For use in the analyses, a median 
split was performed on these scores to split the sample into high trait versus low trait.  
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 Participants were presented with a list of 20 words, containing 10 threatening and 10 neutral 
words (Maddock et al., 2003) using slides on Microsoft Power Point (Microsoft Inc.) presentation 
software. The words were rendered in black lower-case Arial font (size 44) on a white background and 
were centered on the screen. The threat-related words were: “terror”, “victim”, “injury”, “cancer”, “panic”, 
“dangerous”, “threatening”, “emergency”, “violence”, and “destroyed”. Furthermore, the neutral words 
(matched for length and frequency) were: “detect”, “locate”, “track”, “border”, “margin”, “measurement”, 
“impression”, “pertinent”, “arrangement” and “translation”. Each word was presented for two seconds 
followed by a two-second random pattern mask. The word order was quasi-random so that threat and 
neutral words were mixed. Participants were asked to concentrate and try and remember as many 
words as they could.         
 Scores on the trait scale can range from 20-80. In the current data, the scores ranged from 23 
to 75. The median value of the current sample is 41 (M = 43.74, SD = 11.64), which is close to the value 
often found in research findings that include trait anxiety in their analysis (Miller, Few, & Widiger, 2012: 
Few et al., 2016). Following the median split, 46 participants were assigned to the low anxiety group and 
44 to the high anxiety group. For the purposes of additional analyses a quartile split was also conducted 
on the trait scores. Quartile 1 ranged from 23-35, quartile2 ranged from 36-41, quartile 3 ranged from 
42-52 and quartile 4 ranged from 53-75. Therefore, quartile 1 refers to very low trait anxiety, quartile 2 
refers to low trait anxiety, quartile 3 refers to high-trait anxiety and quartile 4 refers to very high-trait 
anxiety.  Following the quartile spilt 25 participants were assigned to very low trait anxiety group 
(quartile 1) and 21 participants were assigned to low trait anxiety group (quartile2) 23 participants were 
assigned to high trait anxiety group (quartile 3) and 21 participants were assigned to very high trait 
anxiety group (quartile 4).        
 Motion videos depicting forward or backward motion were presented on a PC computer running 
Windows 7. These were created as follows: A video clip was recorded from inside the last car of a train 
giving a strong impression of backward motion (visual angle 26.72 x 18.46 degrees). The video was 
edited using Adobe Premier software (Adobe Inc.) and a two-minutes video was extracted to which a 1-
second fade-in and fade-out ramps were added. Sound (train motion—no voices) was normalized and 





Procedure.     The experiment was carried out in a dedicated student research room in the 
Department of Psychology at the University of Roehampton.  Artificial lighting was used during the 
experiment apart from when the participants watched the motion video. At the start of each session, 
participants were briefed and asked to sign a consent form. Following this, they were asked to generate 
a unique number that was used to link their details to their data. This number was written on the consent 
and debriefs forms. Then, participants were asked to fill in a demographics questionnaire and both state 
and trait components of the Spielberger trait anxiety questionnaire (STAI) scale, (Spielberger, 1983).  
This took no longer than ten minutes. Next, participants were asked to view the words and to try to 
remember them. This has taken about 2 minutes. Specifically, the first slide of the presentation stated: 
“You will now see a list of words. Please concentrate and try to remember as many as you can. Click on 
the mouse to start.” The last slide stated: “Thank you, this is the end of the presentation’’. Following this, 
participants were asked to spend ten minutes solving pen and paper average medium difficulty Sudoku 
puzzles as a distractor task taken from (printable-sudoku-puzzles.com). Then participants were shown a 
video of either a train moving forward, backward with the following instructions: ’’You are now going to 
see a short video of a train journey. Please concentrate.’’ The participants in the control group were not 
shown a video and were asked to continue with Sudoku puzzles for another two minutes. The artificial 
light was turned off during the video presentation. Following the videos, all subjects were asked 
to write down as many words as they could remember in any order on a piece of paper within two 
minutes. Then, all participants were asked to complete a state component of STAI again. Finally, 
participants were debriefed. This stage took between five to ten minutes and the whole session lasted 











The means and standard deviations for all the study variables are presented in table 1. Participants 
could have recalled up to 10 threat words, as can be seen in table 1 the mean number of threat words 
recalled is 4.10. Thus, on the whole the participants in the sample recalled low number of words.  
Table 1.  All the means/SDs of all of the study variables 
Variable M SD 
Age 20.40 5.4 
Vision 1.00 .00 
Motion 2.00 .82 
Total Words recalled 8.70 2.88 
Number of threat words recalled 4.10 1.74 
State one total 39.70 12.47 
State two total 39.60 10.91 
Trait total 43.70 11.64 
Note. N=90, M=mean, SD=standard deviation  
Exploratory Data Analysis  
An independent samples t-test compared English versus non-English speakers on the number 
of threat words. Leven’s test for equality of variances revealed that the assumption of equal variances 
had been met, F= .24, p>.05. The t-test revealed no significant difference between the groups, 
t(88)=.05, p>.05. Furthermore, in order to test whether participants’ anxiety level changed during the 
experiment a paired samples t-test was carried out on pre- and post-test STAI scores, revealing no 
significant difference, t=0.11, p>.05. Furthermore, looking at the whole sample participants were slightly 
on the higher end of the anxiety scale versus the lower scale (M = 43.74). In relation to this, the range of 
scores for the state component of the STAI as well as the trait component of the STAI is 20-80 (Julian, 
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2011) with higher score suggesting greater anxiety. For the present data, participants’ scores ranged 
from 20-78 for State 1, and 20-68 for State 2. The average state score at Time 1 (before the 
experiment) is 39.74 (SD = 12.47); the average state score at Time 2 (after the experiment) is 39.63 
(SD=10.91).          
 Furthermore, A two 3x2 between-subjects ANOVAs were conducted looking at the impact (and 
the interaction between) the different motion groups (forward, backward, no motion) and trait anxiety 
(high versus low), calculated by a median split on each of the following variables: 1) Total number of 
threat words recalled 2) Total number of words recalled. The first 3x2 ANOVA (forward, backward, no 
motion x high and low anxious) was conducted on the number of threat words recalled. There was no 
significant difference between the trait groups on the number of threat words recalled, F(1, 84) = 1.75, p 
>.05. There was no significant difference between the three motion groups on the number of threat 
words recalled, F(2, 84) = 1.55, p > .05. Thus, there were no significant main effects from this ANOVA. 
In addition, there was no significant interaction between the two variables (i.e., the three motion groups 
interacting with the two levels of anxiety) on the number of threat words recalled, F(2, 84) = 1.31, p > 
.05. As such, no further post-hoc tests were required. The means and standard deviations for these 













Table 2. Number of threat words recalled 
Trait group Motion M SD N 
















































Note. M=mean, SD=standard deviation, N=number of participants 
The second 3x2 ANOVA tested the differences between low and high-trait anxious exposed to 
the various motion groups on the total of number of words recalled. There was no significant difference 
between the trait groups on total number of words recalled, F(1,84) = .76, p > .05. There was no significant 
difference between the three motion groups on the total number of words recalled, F(2, 84) = 1.49, p > 
.05. Thus, there were no significant main effects from this ANOVA. In addition, there was no significant 
interaction between the two variables (i.e., the three motion groups interacting with the two levels of 
anxiety) on the total number of words recalled, F(2, 84) = .15, p > .05. As such, no further post-hoc tests 
were required. The means and standard deviations for these variables are presented in table 3. 
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Table 3. Total words recalled by the various motion groups 
Trait group Motion          M SD N 
































Total Forward motion 
Backward motion 














Note. M=mean, SD=standard deviation, N=number of participants 
For the purposes of additional analyses a quartile split was also conducted and thus a further 
two 3x4 between-subjects ANOVAs were conducted looking at the impact (and the interaction between) 
the different motion groups (forward, backward, no motion) and trait anxiety (high versus low) on each of 
the following variables: 1) number of threat words recalled 2) Total number of words recalled 3) state 
anxiety scores (pre and post experiment state scores). As mentioned earlier Quartile 1 ranged from 23-
35, quartile 2 ranged from 36-41, quartile 3 ranged from 42-52 and quartile 4 ranged from 53-75. 
Therefore, quartile 1 refers to very low trait anxiety, quartile 2 refers to low trait  anxiety, quartile 3 refers 
to high-trait anxiety and quartile 4 refers to very high-trait anxiety.  Following the quartile spilt 25 
participants were assigned to very low trait anxiety group (quartile 1) 21 participants were assigned to 
low trait anxiety group (quartile 2) 23 participants were assigned to high trait anxiety group (quartile 3) 
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and 21 participants were assigned to very high trait anxiety group (quartile 4). The first 3x4 ANOVA 
tested the differences between the quartile trait anxiety group exposed to the various motion groups on 
the number of threat words recalled. There was no significant main effect for trait (quartile group), F(3, 
78) = 1.94, p > .05. There was no significant main effect for motion group F(2, 78)= 1.60, p>.05. There 
was no significant interaction between trait quartile group and motion group F(6, 78)= .80, p>.05.  As 
such, no further post-hoc tests were required. The second 3x4 ANOVA tested the differences between 
the quartile trait anxiety group exposed to the various motion groups on the number of total of words 
recalled. There was no significant main effect for trait (quartile group), F(3, 78)= 1.16, p >.05. There was 
no significant main effect for motion group F(2, 78)= 1.05, p>.05. There was no significant interaction 
between trait quartile group and motion group F(6, 78)=.40, p>.05. As such, no further post-hoc tests 
were required.   An additional focus was to look at the relationship between motion group and state 
anxiety. Specifically, a 3x2 mixed ANOVA was conducted in order to assess differences between pre 
and post state anxiety score, between the three motion groups and also to examine the interactions 
between motion groups and state anxiety. There was no significant main effect for state anxiety F(1, 
87)= .013, p >.05. There was no main effect of motion, F(2, 87)= .660, p > .05. There was no interaction 







  Research findings coming from a review on memory bias in anxiety are inconclusive with some 
studies that show memory bias and some that do not (Mitte, 2008). More specifically, it also showed that 
clinical status was not significantly linked to effect sizes, indicating no qualitative difference in 
information processing between anxiety patients and non-diagnosed high-trait anxious persons (Mitte, 
2008). This means that more research is needed to better understand the connection between memory 
bias and anxiety. Recent study showed that backward vection improved recall of neutral words 
(Aksentijevic, 2017). Thus, the current study aimed to get a better understanding on memory bias in 
anxiety by the exploration of whether vection-based intervention can lead to an improved memory for 
threat related material in people with high trait anxiety (i.e., sub clinical group). Specifically, this study 
wished to examine whether there were significant differences between the motion groups (forward, 
backward and no motion) on the number of correct threat words recalled.  Furthermore, Initial vigilance 
to threat-relevant information followed by avoidance might prevent the objective evaluation of 
threatening material, which may allow threat-relevant information to continue to elicit anxiety in anxious 
individuals (Coles & Heimberg, 2002). Therefore, the present study was the first to examine whether a 
vection-based intervention can enhance the retrieval of threat-related words over and above that for 
neutral words, thereby counteracting the lack of deep encoding of threat-related words in anxious 
individuals. Moreover, Bower (1981, 1987) suggests that experiencing anxiety will activate emotion 
nodes congruent with anxious mood, which in turn will determine the type of events and behaviours 
individuals can recall. According to this view if participants were more anxious due to the experiment 
they might have been able to recall more threat words. In relation to this Williams et al.’s (1988, 1997) 
model contradicts Bower’s idea that anxiety may be a result of mood-congruent biases in attention since 
anxious individuals might have decreased processing of threat-relevant material due to avoidance 
playing a central role in their anxiety. Thus, according to this view, it is suggested that anxious 
individuals avoid deep processing of threat related material, which should show impaired memory for 
threat-related information.        
 Additionally, Williams et al. (1988, 1997) proposed a model that seems to account for the 
conflicting views of some authors suggesting that anxious individuals are hyper vigilant toward threat-
relevant stimuli whereas others propose that anxious individuals avoid threat-relevant stimuli. This 
model posits that anxious individuals tend to direct their attention toward threat-relevant stimuli during 
early, automatic processing stages. However, at later and more strategic stages of processing, anxious 
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individuals tend to direct their attention away from threat. The attention toward threat-relevant 
information would heighten the anxiety of the individual. However, this would be followed by avoidance 
of threat-relevant stimuli, which would prevent a more elaborated evaluation process that could 
potentially reduce the perceived danger in the threat and lead to reduced anxiety (Bar-Haim et al., 
2007).           
Possible reasons for non-significant findings  
It is important to note that according to the theory by Williams et al. (1988, 1997), avoidance 
could not have played part in not having significant higher recall of threat related words in high-trait 
anxious compared to low anxious. This model posits that anxious people tend to direct their attention 
toward threat relevant stimuli during early, automatic processing stages. However, at later and more 
strategic stages of processing, anxious individuals tend to direct their attention away from threat. The 
attention toward threat-relevant information would heighten the anxiety of the individual. However, there 
was no increase in anxiety scores over the course of the current experiment. Specifically, the current 
experiment did not increase participants’ anxiety, meaning that state anxiety score was not significantly 
higher after the experiment versus the beginning of the experiment, which was a desired outcome. 
Thus, this seems to suggest that avoidance did not play a role in the present study’s findings. 
 Participants' state anxiety (anxiety right now) was measured both at the very beginning of the 
study and at the very end of the study. The aim of the study was to elicit anxiety in participants, such 
that their state two score would be higher than their state one score, since this was believed to be 
caused via the vection based intervention at retrieval stage. Specifically, being presented with threat 
related words might have increased participants’ anxiety at the time of encoding reflecting the first stage 
of hyper vigilance towards threat related stimuli as proposed by Williams et al.’s (1988,1997). 
Furthermore, using backward vection was hoped to counteract the processing stage whereby high-trait 
anxious direct their attention away from threat words. It was hoped that backward vection would bring 
participants back in time to the moment of encoding (i.e., when they were presented with the threat 
related words) thus enabling them to access their anxious mood, which was present at encoding. With 
regards to this Bower’s (1961) model propose that mood congruent recall facilitate better memory or in 
other words would have increased recall of threat words compared to low anxious.   
 A recent experiment showed that using a vection based intervention, thus inducing a sense of 
movement, would psychologically bring back participants to the moment of encoding, which should 
enable them to access previously avoided threat related material (Aksentijevic, 2017).  A paired 
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samples t-test was used to compare state one anxiety with state two, to see whether or not differences 
between these means were significant over time. Interestingly, this finding was not significant in state 
anxiety over the course of this study. Furthermore, a two 3x2 between-subjects ANOVAs were 
conducted in order to examine the impact (and the interaction between) the different motion groups 
(forward, backward, no motion) and trait anxiety (high versus low), calculated by a median split on each 
of the following variables: 1) Total number of threat words recalled 2) Total number of words recalled. 
No significant difference was found.        
 Further analyses using quartile split and thus a further two 3x4 between-subjects ANOVAs were 
conducted looking at the impact (and the interaction between) the different motion groups (forward, 
backward, no motion) and trait anxiety (high versus low) on each of the four variables: 1) number of 
threat words recalled 2) Total number of words recalled 3) state anxiety scores (pre and post 
experiment state scores). No significant difference was found following the use of quartile split. 
 This could, for example, be due to methodological flaws such as individuals not paying enough 
attention when watching the video of train moving backward or forward. This could result in them not 
being immersed in the sensation of movement. If they were not immersed sufficiently in the vection-
based intervention, then at retrieval stage they might not be able to access their anxious mood in 
relation to threat words. This would then lead to such participants not seeing an increase in recall of 
threat words in high-trait anxious compared to low anxious when experiencing vection-based 
intervention. For more information on this please see avenues for future research. Therefore, the 
anxiety levels of this group may not have been influenced by their environment as that was possibly 
being perceived as ‘neutral’. This was supported by the results of the paired samples t-tests whereby a 
significant increase in anxiety over time (i.e., the state scores) was not found.     
 Another possible reason for not having significant results could be the stimuli used in the current 
experiment. As described in methods section the use of words was used in previous research and 
contained of 10 threatening and 10 neutral words (Maddock et al., 2003). The threat-related words 
were: “terror”, “victim”, “injury”, “cancer”, “panic”, “dangerous”, “threatening”, “emergency”, “violence”, 
and “destroyed”. Furthermore, the neutral words (matched for length and frequency) were: “detect”, 
“locate”, “track”, “border”, “margin”, “measurement”, “impression”, “pertinent”, “arrangement” and 
“translation”. On reflection it is observed that the number of syllables in the above words was not 
matched. Also, individuals’ differences with regards to level of anxiety that can be experienced following 
different threat related words should be noted. Perhaps interviewing participants in order to learn which 
words are perceived as more anxiety provoking for them as an individual might be helpful for future 
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research in inducing anxiety.         
 An additional focus was to look at the relationship between motion group and state anxiety. 
Specifically, a 3x2 mixed ANOVA was conducted in order to assess differences between pre and post 
state anxiety score, between the three motion groups and also to examine the interactions between 
motion groups and state anxiety. There was no significant main effect for state anxiety. This might be 
explained due to the data indicating that state anxiety was not increased due to the experiment, 
resulting in no increase from state one (beginning of the experiment) to state two (end of the 
experiment). This may explain why there was no significant difference in the recall of threat words in 
high-trait anxious compared to low anxious individuals. The theoretical basis for the present study 
followed the previously described and well known phenomenon that reproducing the context 
experienced in encoding at the time of recall, facilitates better recall. It was also associated with Bower’s 
(1981) model which suggested that one needs to access the mood individuals experienced at encoding 
at the time of recall in order to facilitate recall. It can be argued that high-trait anxious participants 
experienced anxiety when they were presented with threat related words at the encoding stage. Since 
the anxiety did not increase from the beginning of the experiment to the end of the experiment, it can be 
argued that high-trait anxious individuals were not able to access their anxiety at the recall stage, which 
in turn did not facilitate recall. However, despite these non-significant findings, the current study is the 
first one to test the effect of vection-based intervention on recall in anxiety.    
 It was particularly surprising that backward motion versus no motion and forward motion had no 
significant effects on recall, since Aksentijevic (2017) has shown that backward vection based 
intervention improved recall of words compared to forward vection and random vection. However, 
Aksentijevic (2017) did not test anxiety and did not use threat related material in his study. Several 
explanations could be given for the present study’s non-significant results: it could be argued that not 
being able to increase participants’ level of anxiety from the beginning of the experiment to the end of 
the experiment, meant that when they were mentally brought back to the context of encoding at the time 
of recall they were unable to access their anxious mood, since this was not increased over the course of 
the experiment; resulting in no differences in performance being found.  There is a possibility that 
participants were not immersed sufficiently in the vection based intervention. This would mean that they 
were not mentally brought back to the encoding stage at the time of recall. Furthermore, the model by 
Eysenck et al. (2007) suggests that when individuals consider themselves to be experiencing threat and 
thus anxiety, they then allocate attention widely but not specifically to the task in hand. Consequently, 
they are likely to have reduced attentional control with regards to an ongoing task (Fox, Russo, & 
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George, 2005). It follows that according to this view, participants in the current experiment may have 
had reduced attentional control when coming to recall threat words. Research suggests that individuals 
with high trait anxiety, or in other words individuals who are prone to developing anxiety disorder, might 
generalise threat to both threat related stimuli and neutral stimuli (Dunsmoor, Åhs, & LaBar, 2011). 
Thus, it is possible that participants in the current study classified in their minds both threat words and 
neutral words as threatening. If this was the case, it would explain why despite being transported back 
to the moment of encoding via the vection based intervention (previously hypothesised to enable them 
to access the anxious mood created when encoding the threat words), an anxious mood was created for 
both threat and natural words because of a tendency to generalise across stimuli (Gazendam, 
Kamphuis, & Kindt,  2013; Sehlmeyer et al., 2011). The above hypotheses may provide an explanation 
for the non-difference in recall between the threat words and neutral words, as both were rendered as 
threatening. Perhaps future research could examine the role of intolerance to uncertainty in high-trait 
anxious individuals when exposed to vection based intervention. The Processing Efficiency Theory 
differentiated between accuracy of task performance and amount of resources invested (Eysenck & 
Calvo, 1992). In relation to this it is proposed that anxiety related thoughts which are not relevant to the 
task in hand weaken processing efficiency, whereas worry will cause the individual to be more alert and 
this will counterbalance the effect of anxiety. Again, this might explain why there was no significant 
difference in recall of threat words between high trait anxiety and low trait anxiety.   











Implications of research findings 
Research suggests that individuals actively retrieve good memories as a means of regulating 
negative mood (Josephson, Singer, & Salovey, 1996). Therefore, cognitive biases operating during the 
processing of, for example, a dangerous situation, along with the memory for that event, can influence 
the ability to regulate emotions. This can then lead to susceptibility to anxiety disorders (Joormann, 
Yoon, & Siemer, 2009). The conclusion is that cognitive biases, including memory bias, play a 
significant role in the onset, maintenance and recurrence of anxiety disorders (Tran, Joormann, & 
Hertel, 2011). Initial vigilance to threat-relevant information followed by avoidance might prevent the 
objective evaluation of threatening material, which may allow threat-relevant information to continue to 
elicit anxiety in anxious individuals (Coles & Heimberg, 2002). Thus, the use of vection-based 
intervention to facilitate recall in relation to anxiety seems to be an important new area of research. 
Specifically, gaining a better understanding of how a vection-based intervention can influence the 
retrieval of threat-relevant information, could lead to a better understanding of how to stop threat related 
material continuing to stress high-trait anxious individuals. A vection-based intervention enabling the 
individual to go back mentally in time to the encoding stage, could prevent avoidance and allow 
individuals to objectively evaluate the threatening material. Hopefully, this would lead to the realisation 
that the perceived threat was not as threatening as the individual first perceived it to be. Additionally, 
perhaps the preponderance of women could have influenced the non significant findings. Thus, future 
studies could benefit for using equal numbers of female and males participants.   
 Further considering practical implications for the current study, one very recent study shows that 
the usual tendency to perceive the future as psychologically closer than the past is amplified in 
individuals with high trait anxiety (Rinaldi, Locati, Parolin, & Girelli, 2017). Therefore, practitioners could 
benefit from drawing attention to the role of psychological distance in psychopathology research and 
theory. The findings from the current study might therefore have important clinical implications, in that 
interventions for managing anxiety could benefit from focusing more on ways to help high-trait anxious 
individuals to think about the actual temporal distance of events in time. As previously discussed, 
anxious individuals report viewing future events as more vivid and more likely to occur (Trope & 
Liberman, 2010). Consequently, anxious individuals may be helped by focusing on the actual distance 
of events in time in order to set more positive achievable goals regarding their future. In addition, 
backward movement has been found to reduce the common tendency for the future to be closer than 
the past (Caruso et al., 2013). In other words, vection appears mentally to relocate participants into the 
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past or the future. This can have potentially important implications for therapeutic interventions for 
anxiety disorders, such as reducing perceived catastrophic future events by making future seem less 
close than it is normally perceived. The specific contribution of the present study is that this is the first 
study to attempt to mentally bring back individuals to the encoding stage at the time of recall of threat 
related words, compared between high and low anxious individuals. As a consequence, other 
researchers could build upon these findings as well as taking account of the limitations of the present 



















Limitations of the study and avenues for future research 
The present study found that participants’ state anxiety score did not increase over the course 
of the experiment. Following the model by Bower (1981), it is important that anxiety should increase in 
order for participants to access their anxious mood in relation to threat related material, when encoding 
and at the time of recall. Therefore, based on this limitation, future research could benefit from methods 
to induce more anxiety in participants, for example by showing them a distressing video whilst they try to 
memorise threat related words. Additionally, the whole sample seemed to be slightly more anxious that 
the range of scores indicated. Perhaps providing relaxation exercises at the beginning of the experiment 
could help to ensure a lower level of anxiety at the beginning of the experiment with the hope to 
increase anxiety at the experimental stage and thus to achieve a significant difference between state 
anxiety scores at the beginning of the experiment to the end of the experiment.   
 Lastly, the present study could not ensure that participants paid attention to the vection based 
intervention, with the result that perhaps they were not immersed sufficiently in that. Therefore, perhaps 
future research could benefit from checking immersion in the videos by using an eye-tracking device 
that records eye gaze and thus gives an indication of the level of immersion in the vection based 
intervention (Yasuda, 2015; Gordon & Hoedemaker, 2016). In additional to the eye tracking device, 
asking participants relevant questions after watching the video such as: ‘What was the colour of the 
train?’ could be helpful in checking whether they were fully concentrating and getting immersed in the 
vection-based intervention. Inducing more anxiety by using a distressing video, whilst showing the 
participants threat related words, could be helpful in order for the state anxiety scores to increase over 
the course of the experiment. This would mean that perhaps participants would be able to access their 
anxious mood experienced at encoding at the time of recall and this would be likely to facilitate higher 
recall of threat related words. Additionally, manipulating the type of videos shown, such as showing a 
different video to induce a sense of movement, as well as increasing the speed of movement and its 
duration, could perhaps elicit greater differences in recall performance.  Finally, when embarking on the 
current research study it did not seem necessary to conduct a pilot study. However, on reflection a pilot 






In conclusion, the present study has examined for the first time the impact of vection based 
intervention on recall of threat related words versus neutral words in high-trait anxious participants 
compared to low anxious. Previous research has suggested that the perception of future events as 
being closer than past events appears to be exaggerated in high-trait anxious participants. 
Consequently, anxious individuals may be helped by focusing on the actual distance of events in time 
and in this way to set more positive achievable goals regarding their future. The present study is the first 
study in this area of research and therefore building on its findings, as well as its limitations in 
methodology, could help further research to better understand the role of anxiety in memory, when 
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PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM  
 
Title of Research Project: The effects of induced motion on memory for words 
 
Brief Description of Research Project, and What Participation Involves:  
 
This study aims to investigate the effects of motion perception on memory. You will be presented with a 
list of words, and asked to memorise these. After a 10-minute interval you might be asked to watch a 
short video of a train journey. Finally, you will be asked to recall as many words as possible within two 
minutes. The participation should take no more than 45 minutes, and you will be accredited with 0.75 
credits in return for your participation.  
 
Data that is collected will be kept strictly confidential and anonymous, which means no participants’ detail 
of identification will be recorded and would therefore mean it would not be possible to link the 
questionnaire that the participant provided. To make this possible, all participants will be assigned a code 
so that only you would be able to know. If you choose to withdraw at any stage (before, during or after the 
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I agree to take part in this research, and am aware that I am free to withdraw at any point without giving 
a reason, although if I do so I understand that my data might still be used in a collated form. I understand 
that the information I provide will be treated in confidence by the investigator and that my identity will be 
protected in the publication of any findings, and that data will be collected and processed in accordance 










Please note: if you have a concern about any aspect of your participation or any other queries please 
raise this with the investigator (or if the researcher is a student you can also contact the Director of 
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PARTICIPANT DEBRIEF 
 
Title of Research Project: Effects of induced motion on the recall of threatening words 
 
Thank you very much for taking part in this study, we greatly appreciate your contribution. 
 
Recent research has demonstrated that walking or imagining walking backwards improves memory for 
words. Similarly, word recall is improved if participants are asked to watch a video of backward motion 
(Aksentijevic et al., in preparation). Physical, imaginary or induced motion facilitates mental time travel 
which “transports” participants back to the time of encoding thus facilitating memory. The aim of the 
present experiment was to establish if watching a video of backward motion would improve the memory 
for threatening words. As this is often associated with levels of anxiety, we also measured your trait and 
state anxiety scores. If you would like to learn more about this research, please contact Dr Alex 
Aksentijevic (a.aksentijevic@roehampton.ac.uk). 
 
All data gathered during this study will be held securely. You can withdraw from participation from the 
whole experiment or any part of it at any point without needing to justify your decision. You can also 
request for your data to be withdrawn at any time after participation in the study. In order to do this, 
please contact the investigator with your participant number. Please be aware, however, that data may 
still be used in a collated form. Finally, if you are a student who is volunteering for course credits as part 
of an undergraduate module, please be advised that there will be no adverse consequences in relation 
to assessment for your degree if you decide to withdraw.  
 
Should you have any concern about any aspect of your participation in this study, please raise it with the 
investigator in the first instance, or with the Project Supervisor or Head of Psychology.  
Investigator Contact Details: 
 
Elinor Sason  
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Dr Aleksandar Aksentijevic  Dr Diane Bray 
Dept. of Psychology Dept. of Psychology 
University of Roehampton University of Roehampton 
Whitelands College Whitelands College 
Holybourne Avenue Holybourne Avenue 
London   SW15 4JD London   SW15 4JD 















Age (years, months):_________ 
 
Gender:       Male 
                                        Female 




Is English your first language? Yes No 
 
If not, please state your first language: ________________ 
 
If not, how long have you been speaking English (years)? _________ 
 





A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given below. Read each 
statement and then circle the appropriate number to the right of the statement to indicate how you feel 
right now, that is, at this moment in time. There are no right and wrong answers. Do not spend too 
much time on each statement but give the answer which seems to describe your present feelings best. 
 
Not at all        Somewhat           Moderately       Very much 
 
1. I feel calm                                                  1                          2                          3                    4 
 
2. I feel secure                                                1                          2                          3                    4 
 
3. I am tense                                                   1                          2                          3                    4 
 
4. I feel strained                                             1                          2                          3                    4 
 
5. I feel at ease                                               1                          2                          3                    4 
 
6. I feel upset                                                  1                          2                          3                    4 
 
7. I am presently worrying over 
possible misfortunes                                      1                          2                          3                    4 
 
8. I feel satisfied                                             1                          2                          3                    4 
 
9. I feel frightened                                          1                          2                          3                    4 
 
10. I feel comfortable                                     1                          2                          3                    4 
 
11. I feel self confident                                  1                          2                          3                    4 
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12. I feel nervous                                           1                          2                          3                    4 
 
13. I am jittery                                                1                          2                          3                    4 
 
14. I feel indecisive                                        1                          2                          3                    4 
 
15. I am relaxed                                             1                          2                          3                    4 
 
16. I feel content                                            1                          2                          3                    4 
 
17. I am worried                                             1                          2                          3                    4 
 
18. I feel confused                                          1                          2                          3                    4 
 
19. I feel steady                                              1                          2                          3                    4 
 
20. I feel pleasant                                     1                  2                      3                                        4
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TRAIT QUESTIONAIRE  
 
A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given 
below. Read each statement and then circle the appropriate number to the right of 
the statement to indicate how you GENERALLY feel. There are no right and wrong 
answers. Do not spend too much time on each statement but give the answer, which 
seems to describe you best. 
  
1. I feel pleasant                       1                             2                      3                      4 
2. I feel nervous and restless    1                            2                      3                       4 
3. I feel satisfied with myself     1                              2                     3                      4 
4. I wish I could be as happy    1                                2                     3                    4 
as others seem to be            
5. I feel like a failure                  1                               2                     3                     4 
6. I feel rested                           1                               2                      3                    4 
7. I am ‘cool, calm and collected’ 1                            2                      3                    4         
8. I feel that the difficulties are     1                              2                     3                   4   
piling up so that I cannot             
overcome them 
9. I worry too much over something  1                       2                     3                      4   
that doesn't really matter 
10. I am happy                                     1                       2                     3                     4   
11. I have disturbing thoughts              1                       2                     3                     4    
12. I lack self-confidence                      1                       2                     3                     4   
13. I feel secure                                    1                       2                     3                     4   
14. I make decisions easily                   1                       2                     3                     4   
15. I feel inadequate                             1                       2                     3                     4   




















17. Some unimportant thoughts                     1                    2                     3                      4   
run through my mind and bother me  
18. I take disappointments so keenly             1                   2                      3                      4   
that I can’t put them out of my mind  
19. I am a steady person                                 1             2                     3                           4   
20. I get in a state of tension or turnmoil as I think   1    2                     3                           4                  
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